After the Takedown: The Continuing Operations of NoName057(16)

Since emerging in March 2022, NoName057(16) has remained active as one of the more persistent pro-Russian hacktivist groups online. Much of its activity revolves around DDoSia, a volunteer-driven DDoS project that encourages supporters to take part in attacks against websites in Ukraine and countries supporting it. Over the years, government portals, banks, transport operators and media outlets across Europe have all featured among its targets.

But what makes NoName057(16) interesting is not just the number of attacks it claims. It is how difficult the group has been to keep offline. Its Telegram channels, chats, bots and email addresses have been blocked repeatedly, yet the group has continued to rebuild its presence, move its followers to new platforms and resume its activities.

Our investigation into NoName057(16) actually began somewhere else. While looking into Dark Storm Team, another hacktivist group, we came across repeated instances of its members amplifying NoName's content. Some were also active in NoName's own DDoSia chat. These connections led us to look more closely at NoName's Telegram channels, its DDoSia community and a newly launched Tor portal.

What we found went beyond another attempt to restore a blocked online presence. Within a matter of weeks, NoName057(16) had launched its own darknet portal, started publishing alleged data leaks alongside its DDoS claims, and continued bringing together dozens of allied hacktivist groups.

This report follows those developments to examine how NoName057(16) operates today, how it maintains its presence despite repeated disruptions, and the wider network of groups and individuals surrounding it.

Picking Up the Trail from Dark Storm

The earlier investigation into Dark Storm Team had already revealed several connections to NoName057(16). Dark Storm had repeatedly shared content from NoName's Telegram channels, while its reported owner was also active in NoName's DDoSia chat. These findings provided a starting point for tracing NoName's own network.

The first step was to revisit the Telegram identifiers and infrastructure that had surfaced during that investigation:

  • Current English-language channel: NNM057(16) eng vers (3869927851)
  • Previous English-language channel: 3087552512
  • DDoSia Project chat: 3998644606
  • NoName Tor portal: nnmo************nid.onion (launched on 26 October 2026)

Among these leads, the Tor address proved particularly useful. Searching it through StealthMole's Telegram Tracker brought up the original announcement in which NoName introduced the portal to its followers. In the announcement, the group presented the portal as a full-fledged database on the darknet, accessible only through Tor and intended, as it put it, "for insiders only".

The announcement also gave a first look at what the portal was designed to offer. This included an anonymous channel for submitting data, downloads of the DDoS client, a section called "Tribunal", video footage of the group's operations and a dedicated news feed. It was more than just another replacement website. NoName was presenting it as a central platform for its activities and communications.

Within days of its launch, the portal would take on another role, with the group beginning to publish what it claimed were leaked company databases.

Another detail that emerged during this process concerned the Telegram channels themselves. In the Dark Storm investigation, one of NoName's channels had initially been treated as its Russian-language channel. However, a closer examination of its posts through StealthMole showed that they were consistently published under the name "NNM057(16) eng vers". The channel was not Russian-language at all. It was NoName's previous English-language channel, which was eventually replaced by a new one on 23 October 2026.

The two channels were identified as:

  • Previous English-language channel: 3087552512 (t.me/nnm05*********sh)
  • Current English-language channel: 3869927851

This was an important correction to the earlier investigation. NoName's Telegram presence was not as straightforward as it first appeared. Channels were being replaced, and relying on their identifiers or earlier descriptions without checking the actual message content could easily lead to incorrect conclusions.

With the portal now identified and the channel history better understood, the investigation moved towards a closer look at how NoName maintains its Telegram presence and what happens each time one of its channels is taken down.

Banned, Rebuilt and Back Online

To understand how NoName057(16) manages to maintain its presence despite repeated disruptions, the investigation went further back into the group's Telegram history, starting with its original Russian-language channel.

  • 1732250465 – t.me/no********6

Searching this channel through StealthMole's Telegram Tracker revealed that it was connected to a much wider network than a single broadcast channel. Its posts regularly ended with the same footer, directing followers to four destinations: "NoName057(16) | DDoSia Project | Резерв | Eng version".

This showed that NoName was maintaining several parts of its Telegram presence in parallel, including its main channel, DDoSia community, a reserve channel and an English-language version. Following these references through the channel's messages helped identify the associated accounts:

  • 1788112829 – NoName057(16) Chat, the discussion group linked to the main channel
  • 1535137265 – NoName057(16)_reserve, the reserve channel
  • 1733805264 – NoName057(16) Еng, the English-language channel identified in 2024
  • 1721768523 – NoName057(16) Еng Chat, its associated English discussion group

The historical collection also provided some indication of how this network changed over time. StealthMole's last collected data from the reserve channel dates back to November 2023, while collection of the main Russian-language channel stops in early December 2024. By September 2026, the group's English-language presence had moved to another channel, which was subsequently replaced on 23 October 2026.

The two more recent English-language channels were:

  • 3087552512 – Previous English channel, active from September to October 2026
  • 3869927851 – Current English channel, established on 23 October 2026

However, replacing channels was only one part of the group's approach. NoName also used Telegram bots to make sure followers could find its latest accounts without having to search for them manually. Between September and October 2026, three different bots were promoted in succession, alongside a separate link-hub channel:

  • @FCnnm********t – Promoted in September 2026
  • @actln********t – Promoted on 13 October 2026
  • @info*********t – Promoted on 24 October 2026 and also linked from the group's Tor portal
  • NNM*********t – Link-hub channel

The same pattern of replacement appeared in the group's contact addresses. A post published on 12 January 2024 in the original Russian-language channel informed followers that its previous email mailbox had been blocked and was unlikely to be restored. The group provided a replacement address and ended the announcement with a defiant statement: "we cannot be blocked or destroyed".

The contact addresses identified across the group's history include:

  • nnm*****@proton.me – 2022
  • 05******@proton.me – 2023
  • n****@tutanota.com – Introduced in January 2024
  • stop***r@*mail.net – #OP404 intake address, August 2024
  • stop***4@proton.me – #OP404 intake address, August 2024

NoName's Telegram presence also extends beyond its Russian- and English-language audiences. During the investigation, Spanish-language versions of its recent posts were found being forwarded into Spanish-speaking channels. These forwards led to a source channel that does not have a direct record in StealthMole, meaning its identity and original activity could not be independently examined through the available collection.

There is also a gap in the group's current Russian-language presence. The channel used by NoName in 2026 could not be directly identified during this investigation. Instead, its posts were found through a bot called "Mute Master", which reposts the content into the news topic of the DDoSia Project chat.

  • Mute Master bot: @MuteMaster***t
  • Telegram user ID: 8074160954

This means the group's current Russian-language activity can still be followed through its mirrored messages, even though the original channel remains unidentified.

Mapping NoName057(16)'s Telegram Infrastructure

Bringing these findings together provides a clearer picture of the group's communication infrastructure, including its historical channels, replacement accounts, bots and contact addresses.

Identifier

Name

Type

Language

Recorded activity

1732250465

NoName057(16)

Main channel

Russian

2022 – Dec 2024

1788112829

NoName057(16) Chat

Linked chat

Russian

2023 – 2024

1535137265

NoName057(16)_reserve

Reserve channel

Russian

Until Nov 2023

1733805264

NoName057(16) Еng

Channel

English

2024

1721768523

NoName057(16) Еng Chat

Linked chat

English

2024

3087552512

NNM057(16) eng vers

Channel

English

Sep – Oct 2026

3869927851

NNM057(16) eng vers

Channel

English

Since 23 Oct 2026

4456684114

Unknown (identified through forwards)

Channel

Spanish

Nov 2026

8074160954

Mute Master

Mirror bot

Russian

2026

@FCnn**bot

Link bot

Bot

—

Sep 2026

@actln**bot

Link bot

Bot

—

Oct 2026

@info***bot

Link bot

Bot

—

Since 24 Oct 2026

nn**@proton.me

Contact address

Email

—

2022

057**@proton.me

Contact address

Email

—

2023

no*@tutanota.com

Contact address

Email

—

Since Jan 2024

stop*r@xmail.net

#OP404 intake

Email

—

Aug 2024

stop**24@proton.me

#OP404 intake

Email

—

Aug 2024

What emerges from this mapping is a group that has built several ways to maintain contact with its followers. The reserve channel, replacement English channels, rotating link bots and alternative email addresses all serve different purposes, but together they make the group's online presence less dependent on any single account.

Even when some of its original channels are no longer available, older posts, forwarded messages and replacement accounts provide ways to follow its activity. The investigation also shows why historical Telegram data matters: without the earlier channel records, much of the group's replacement activity and the connections between its accounts would be considerably harder to piece together.

Inside DDoSia

While NoName's Telegram channels are used to publish announcements and updates, DDoSia is where the group's attack activities are organised around a volunteer community. The project provides participants with a DDoS client and instructions on how to take part in attacks. Its Telegram community, much like NoName's other channels, has also changed over time.

Investigating the current DDoSia chat through StealthMole's Telegram Tracker, and pivoting on the contact email addresses identified earlier, led to an older chat used by the project during 2023 and 2024. This established a connection between the group's earlier and current communities:

  • 1228309110 – DDosia Project (2023–2024)
  • 3998644606 – Current DDoSia Project chat (t.me/+C**********y)

The current chat is organised as a Telegram forum, with separate topics for different discussions. Its news topic is particularly useful because it also serves as a channel for NoName's Russian-language announcements, which are reposted by the Mute Master bot.

One example appeared on 21 October 2026, when Mute Master shared proof of a DDoS attack against La Poste Mobile. The post appeared in the DDoSia chat on the same day NoName first claimed to have leaked data from the company.

Beyond announcements, the chat provides a closer look at how participants are brought into the project. Three versions of the DDoSia client were found being distributed:

  • d_win_x64.exe
  • d_win_x32.exe
  • d_win_arm64.exe

New participants were also directed to a setup guide hosted on Teletype under NoName's own account:

  • Setup guide: teletype.**/@noname05716/kx******c

The discussions also reveal something about how the administrators position the project. When asked whether they accepted paid attack requests, the administrators stated that they did not take commissions, even for money. This suggests that the project publicly presents itself as a volunteer-driven operation rather than a service accepting commercial attack orders.

Recruitment, meanwhile, continues through the group's English-language channel. A post published there promoted a new invitation link for the DDoSia community, providing another route for English-speaking followers to join.

From DDoS to "Audits"

For most of its history, NoName057(16) focused on taking websites offline, regularly publishing target lists alongside check-host.net results as proof of its attacks. By October 2026, however, its publications had started to change. The group was no longer just claiming service disruptions. It was beginning to publish alleged data leaks and claims of access to company systems.

The first example appeared on 21 October 2026, when the group's previous English-language channel announced an alleged leak involving French mobile operator La Poste Mobile, claiming 25,000 affected accounts.

Following the launch of its Tor portal on 26 October, these disclosures became more structured. The new English-language channel began publishing what NoName called "audits", with the accompanying material hosted under the portal's /companies section.

  • Portal: nnmo57*********************************jnid.onion/companies

The first major audit targeted French internet provider Free S.A.S. (Iliad). On 29 October, NoName claimed to have disrupted several services, accessed customer accounts and obtained a database containing 636,932 users. Danish manufacturer Danfoss followed on 3 November, with a DDoS claim and a sample of more than 2,500 lines of alleged login credentials. The same day, La Poste Mobile was featured again in what the group described as a completed audit.

The posts carried the hashtags #FuckEastwood and #TimeOfRetribution, referencing Operation Eastwood, the 2025 international law enforcement action against the group. The leak sizes and access claims remain NoName's own assertions and have not been independently verified.

The group also continued publishing claims of access to industrial systems and surveillance infrastructure. These included a greenhouse control system in South Korea, a water treatment facility, CCTV cameras, a fuel tank farm and a hydroelectric plant in Italy, as well as a drying plant and gas facility in Germany. In one post, NoName claimed to have renamed a German drying plant's control system to "noname05716".

These are reported claims rather than independently confirmed intrusions, but they show the range of targets NoName is now using in its public messaging.

The Tribunal

The portal's "Tribunal" section introduced another dimension to the group's activities. Before the portal launched, NoName had already been publishing posts in its previous English-language channel naming individuals it accused of acting against Russia.

One post listed ten people and offered a reward for "useful information" about them, directing followers to submit information through the Tor portal.

This marked a shift from targeting organisations and their infrastructure to publicly identifying individuals. Alongside the company audits, the Tribunal shows how NoName is using its new portal to bring different forms of activity under one roof, from alleged data exposure to the public targeting of individuals.

Friends of NoName

NoName057(16)'s activities extend well beyond its own Telegram channels and DDoSia community. Its posts regularly feature other hacktivist groups, whether through joint campaigns, declared alliances or the amplification of attacks carried out by others. Following these connections through StealthMole's Telegram Tracker revealed a network that has developed over several years.

One of the clearest examples dates back to August 2024, when NoName launched #OP404, a campaign targeting Ukrainian internet infrastructure. The original Russian-language channel published a call to arms naming around 60 allied groups. Four days later, a follow-up post repeated the list and asked participating groups to submit their information through two dedicated email addresses.

The list included CyberArmyofRussia, UserSec, HorusTeam, Keymous+, 313 Team, CyberVolk, RipperSec, CyberDragon, 7 October Union, HackNeT and OverFlame, among others.

The response was visible almost immediately. HackNeT, CyberVolk, Autodafe, CyberDragon, Keymous+ and Anonymous Guys reposted the call within hours, followed by 7 October Union and Holy League the following morning. This provided an early indication that NoName's campaigns were being circulated beyond its own audience.

The connections continued into 2026. Through its English-language channels, NoName publicly announced alliances with D1srupt0r and CyberTroll, and promoted a joint campaign against Denmark with Z-pentest. It also regularly forwarded publications from other groups, including CCTV access claims from Team1914 and posts from Shadow Clawz 404, ServerKillers and the pro-Palestinian group BD Anonymous.

Dark Storm and the Wider Network

Dark Storm Team also appears within this wider network. The relationship is visible in both directions: Dark Storm repeatedly amplified NoName's publications, while NoName's English-language channel also forwarded Dark Storm content.

Combined with GLITCH's direct interaction in the DDoSia chat, these findings show that the connection between the two groups extends beyond occasional reposting. However, the available evidence does not establish a formal organisational relationship.

Helping Allies Raise Funds

Another interesting connection emerged from NoName's relationship with Народная КиберАрмия России (People's CyberArmy of Russia, NKA).

The Russian-language channel frequently forwarded NKA publications. In March 2024, NKA circulated an appeal for donations to support its DDoS tools, platforms and botnets. NoName subsequently reposted the appeal in both its main channel and its discussion group.

The appeal also included payment details, including a bank card and a Monero wallet:

NKA Monero wallet:

4B3ZNG1**********************************************************1Kkx

The wallet belongs to NKA, not NoName. However, the decision to circulate the fundraising appeal shows that the relationship between the groups goes beyond sharing attack announcements. NoName was also helping bring financial support to an allied group.

Conclusion

What started with a few connections uncovered during the Dark Storm investigation revealed a much wider picture of NoName057(16). The investigation found a group that has built its presence around multiple channels, replacement accounts and alternative communication routes, allowing it to maintain contact with its followers despite repeated disruptions. At the same time, its activities have expanded beyond DDoS attacks to include alleged data leaks, company "audits" and the public targeting of individuals through its Tribunal.

Its network of allied hacktivist groups adds another layer, with relationships ranging from joint campaigns and mutual amplification to fundraising support. Dark Storm Team is one example of how these connections extend across different communities.

For NoName057(16), taking down a channel has never necessarily meant taking down the operation. The challenge is tracing what comes next.

Editorial Note

Attribution in hacktivist investigations is rarely straightforward. Accounts disappear, identities overlap and claims are not always independently verifiable. This case demonstrates how StealthMole's historical Telegram collection and cross-platform pivots can help connect scattered identifiers, recover earlier activity and build a clearer picture of the networks behind it.

To access the unmasked report or full details, please reach out to us separately.

Contact us: support@stealthmole.com



Labels: ,

Dark Storm Team: Operations, Alliances and DDoS-for-Hire Services

Over the past few years, hacktivist groups have become more organised in how they operate and present themselves online. What once started as small, loosely connected collectives has gradually developed into a network of groups that maintain multiple Telegram channels, announce alliances, cross-promote attack claims, and use major geopolitical events to gain visibility.

Dark Storm Team is one such group. First observed in late 2023, it gained widespread attention in March 2025 after claiming responsibility for a large-scale outage affecting X (formerly Twitter). The incident brought the group into the spotlight, attracting attention from media outlets, cybersecurity researchers, and even Elon Musk himself.

Despite the attention, there is still no clear picture of what Dark Storm Team actually represents. It has been described as a pro-Palestinian hacktivist group, associated with the pro-Russian hacktivist ecosystem, and linked to the commercial sale of DDoS attacks. These descriptions are not necessarily contradictory, but they raise questions about the group's actual structure, affiliations, and activities beyond its public attack claims.

To get a closer look, this investigation moved beyond public reporting and focused on Dark Storm Team's own activity across Telegram. Using StealthMole, we followed the group's channels, tracked changes in its online presence, and examined the accounts and communities interacting with it. The investigation revealed a network built around a recurring persona, multiple channel migrations, a steady stream of claimed attacks, commercial DDoS offerings, and connections with other hacktivist groups.

The Face Behind the Storm

Behind Dark Storm Team's public activity is a recurring persona known as GLITCH. Across the Telegram channels examined during this investigation, GLITCH consistently appeared as the group's owner, spokesperson, and point of contact for its commercial services. He announced new channels, published attack claims, issued threats against critical infrastructure, and personally handled purchase enquiries.

His public statements also made little attempt to hide the group's intentions. In May 2026, he posted a direct threat against critical infrastructure, stating that the group would attack it "when I want". The message ended with a simple signature: "-GLITCH".

However, the account behind this persona has not remained the same. On 1 May 2025, a pinned message in the Dark Storm chat announced that Telegram had banned the team's owner and that an investigation was underway. By the following day, GLITCH had returned under a different account. He told members that his previous account had been banned without explanation and added that the group now knew "how to not ban again".

Using StealthMole's Telegram Tracker, we pivoted from GLITCH's known user nodes to identify the accounts associated with the persona. This revealed several accounts used for different purposes over time:

  • Main owner account used since May 2025: @MRHEL***1 (User ID: 6147437922)
  • Declared backup account: @MRHEL****3 (User ID: 8398245341)
  • Account used for sales and service enquiries, renamed in mid-2026: @glitch****1 → @MRHEL*****2 (User ID: 8797265807)
  • Earlier owner account, banned in May 2025: @DarkStorm****3

GLITCH was relatively open about these connections. In November 2025, he published a message explicitly identifying his main and backup accounts. The sales account followed a similar pattern. Between May and July 2026, Dark Storm's service advertisements directed potential buyers to @glitch******1. From July onwards, the same Telegram user ID, 8797265807, appeared under the new username @MRHEL******2. The account continued to handle the group's sales advertisements.

A more revealing connection emerged on 21 October 2026, when GLITCH appeared in a Telegram chat called DDoSia Project. The group is used by NoName057(16) volunteers operating the group's DDoS client. GLITCH introduced himself with the message "its me darkstorm" and then asked whether anyone recognised him.

When another participant jokingly questioned whether he was really the administrator of Dark Storm, GLITCH replied, "i am owner". A responder answered in Russian that they already knew and that there was no need to announce it.

The exchange provided a direct example of GLITCH identifying himself as Dark Storm's owner in a community associated with another hacktivist operation.

The conversation became more unusual shortly afterwards. GLITCH wrote that he needed help "from putin to use nuclear on usa, europe". Another participant pointed out that his profile indicated he was from Russia and questioned why he was communicating in English. GLITCH responded in Russian, explaining that he did not speak with many Russians.

While the exchange offered a glimpse into how GLITCH presents himself within other hacktivist communities, it did not establish a formal relationship between Dark Storm and NoName057(16). What it did confirm was that the persona was willing to publicly identify himself as the owner of Dark Storm in a chat associated with the DDoSia project.

But identifying the operator behind an online persona is a different challenge altogether.

On 7 October 2025, an Indian hacktivist channel published a post titled "Owner of TEAM DARK STORM". The post was subsequently forwarded into the Bhartiya Hunters chat. It listed two of GLITCH's Telegram accounts alongside their user IDs, followed by what it claimed were the owner's real identity, contact details, address, and Facebook profile.

At first, the post appeared worth investigating. The Telegram handles and user IDs matched accounts already associated with GLITCH. However, this did not independently validate the identification. Those account details had already been publicly disclosed by GLITCH himself, meaning they offered no new evidence of the operator's real-world identity.

We then examined the remaining information through StealthMole. Several inconsistencies emerged. The post combined several details within the same profile, while the document number it provided appeared to be a sequence of digits taken directly from the listed phone number. A pivot using the associated landline in StealthMole's Dark Web Tracker returned only unrelated database dumps in which the same digits appeared as record values.

The Facebook profile associated with the listed mobile number was consistent with the name mentioned in the post. However, there was no evidence connecting that profile, phone number, or identity to any of GLITCH's Telegram accounts.

The source was a rival hacktivist group, the information could not be independently corroborated, and the inconsistencies raised further questions about its reliability.

Built to Survive Bans

If there is one thing Dark Storm Team has demonstrated over time, it is its ability to rebuild its online presence after repeated platform bans.

Telegram has removed several of the group's channels, chat groups, and owner accounts. However, each removal was followed by a replacement, often within a short period. New links were circulated through backup channels, existing chat groups, and allied hacktivist communities. By tracing these changes through StealthMole's Telegram Tracker, we were able to reconstruct how Dark Storm's Telegram infrastructure developed from early 2025 through September 2026.

The first major disruption came in May 2025, when Telegram banned the group's owner account. GLITCH responded by announcing a replacement account and sharing a backup channel, asking existing members to move there. Additional channels appeared over the following months:

  • Backup channel shared in May 2025: t.me/Darkstorm*****2
  • Channel first observed in June 2025: t.me/darkstorm*****1
  • Channel first observed in August 2025: t.me/darkstorm***f

By October 2025, this had become a recurring pattern. On 18 October, Dark Storm announced that its channel had been banned and directed followers to a replacement. Its presence on X faced similar disruptions. The account was reportedly banned at least three times in succession during the same period, with new handles announced through Telegram. By 27 October, the group had settled on another account and pinned the announcement for its followers.

  • Main channel from October 2025: t.me/Darkstorm**k (Telegram ID: 3171169119)
  • X account announced and pinned on 27 October 2025: x.com/dark******3

The same cycle continued throughout 2026. By March, a new main Telegram channel was active. On 5 May, Dark Storm announced another replacement channel alongside a new chat group. The September migration was particularly revealing because the replacement was not promoted by Dark Storm alone.

In early September, another Dark Storm channel was removed. This time, Team1914, one of the group's closest allies, circulated the announcement to its own followers, referring to Dark Storm as "our alliance Dark Storm Team" and sharing the replacement links. Within hours, Dark Storm had established another channel, which immediately informed members that the previous one had been banned.

The successive replacements included:

  • Main channel by March 2026: t.me/Dark**Storm**** (Telegram ID: 3576990196)
  • Created on 5 May 2026: t.me/Darkstorm****2 (Telegram ID: 3908675424)
  • Chat group established in May 2026: t.me/darkst***s (Telegram ID: 3900953888)
  • Created on 7 September 2026 and identified as the current main channel in the investigation: t.me/darkst****9 (Telegram ID: 4473764827)

Reconstructing the Channel Network

The Telegram Tracker results allowed us to consolidate the group's known channels and chat groups into a single timeline. Rather than treating each replacement as an isolated account, we used the recurring names, announcements, account references, and cross-posted links to map their relationship with the wider Dark Storm presence.

Channel / Chat

Telegram ID

Role

First observed

t.me/darkstorm*****t

2569741321

Dark Storm chat

May 2025

t.me/Darkstorm*****2

–

Backup channel

May 2025

t.me/darkstorm*****1

–

Channel

June 2025

t.me/darkstorm*****f

–

Channel

August 2025

t.me/Darkstorm*****k

3171169119

Main channel

October 2025

t.me/darkstorm*****2

3046079531

Chat group

November 2025

t.me/darkstorm*****7

–

Backup channel

November 2025

t.me/Darkstorm*****d

–

Channel

December 2025

t.me/Darkstorm*****3

–

Backup channel

December 2025

t.me/DARKSTORM*****E

2738650209

Update channel

February 2026

t.me/Storm*********s

3564004834

Services channel

February 2026

t.me/Dark**Storm***m

3576990196

Main channel

March 2026

t.me/Darkstorm*****2

3908675424

Main channel

May 2026

t.me/darkstorm*****s

3900953888

Chat group

May 2026

t.me/darkstorm*****9

4473764827

Current main channel

September 2026

The group's presence on X showed a similar pattern. Several handles appeared in October 2025 alone, reflecting the repeated changes to its social media accounts:

  • x.com/Darkstorm*****2
  • x.com/Darkstorm*****s
  • x.com/Darkstorm*****0
  • x.com/darkteam******3

What stands out is that Dark Storm's continued presence does not depend on a single Telegram channel or social media account. The group maintains alternative channels, announces replacements through existing communities, and benefits from allied groups that help distribute new links when its own channels disappear.

The September 2026 migration involving Team1914 is particularly important in this regard. It shows that Dark Storm's recovery process can extend beyond its own network, with allied channels helping it maintain visibility and reconnect with followers.

With the group's communication infrastructure mapped out, the investigation moved to the activity taking place across these channels. Beyond maintaining its presence, what was Dark Storm actually claiming, offering, and coordinating?

Inside the Campaigns

Dark Storm's Telegram channels serve another important purpose beyond maintaining the group's online presence: they provide a running record of its claimed attacks.

Most posts follow a familiar format. A target website is listed alongside a red cross symbol, followed by a Check-Host link presented as proof that the website is unreachable. The posts usually end with hashtags such as #DARKSTORM, #DARKSTORMTEAM, and a campaign-specific tag like #OpGermany or #OpEstonia. Some claims also include the phrase "closed by geo", suggesting that the target may have restricted access based on the visitor's geographical location.

Reviewing these posts chronologically through StealthMole's Telegram Tracker revealed how the group's targeting developed over time. Its earlier activity focused heavily on popular online platforms, but gradually expanded into country-specific campaigns involving government institutions, financial organisations, transport infrastructure, and other critical services.

Late 2025: Platform Attacks and the Canada Campaign

The main channel active from October 2025 initially showed a strong focus on high-profile online platforms. Within its first few weeks, Dark Storm claimed attacks against Reddit, Ancestry, Netflix, the Amino app, and even the cybercrime forum DarkForums.

  • t.me/Darkstorm*****k (Telegram ID: 3171169119)

On 24 October 2025, the group added SpaceX to its list of targets. It later reposted a TechNadu article covering the claim, suggesting that media attention was also an important part of how Dark Storm presented its operations.

The same period marked the beginning of a more sustained national campaign under #OpCanada. Over several days, the group published claims involving a Canadian national security and intelligence portal, regional airports, public transport services, taxi companies, and the Federation of Canadian Municipalities.

By November, the targeting had expanded across several countries. Posts referenced Finland's Ministry of Defence and defence company Patria, Israeli government websites, Italian airports, Ukrainian ministries, Belgian intelligence and Antwerp airport, and Danish government services.

These campaigns showed that Dark Storm was no longer limiting its activity to recognisable online platforms. Government and public infrastructure had become a regular part of its target selection.

Early 2026: European Targets and #OpAustria

By March 2026, Dark Storm was publishing claims involving Finland's central bank and several Danish airports under the broader campaign tags #OpEurope and #OpAsia.

The activity became more concentrated in May, when the group launched #OpAustria ahead of Austria hosting Eurovision 2026. Its newly established channel published claims involving the city and airport of Graz, BAWAG and Euram banks and others.

The group also shared an Austrian news article discussing rising cyberattacks around the Eurovision contest, connecting its own claims to the wider attention surrounding the event.

  • t.me/Dark**Storm**m (Telegram ID: 3576990196)
  • t.me/Darkstorm****2 (Telegram ID: 3908675424)

Austria was part of a much wider targeting pattern during this period. Other posts involved Ukrainian cities and defence enterprises, Israeli government ministries and banks, UK energy and drone companies, and South Korean government services, including the Ministry of Education and e-government portals.

One particularly notable claim concerned London Gatwick Airport. Dark Storm stated that the airport had been "down for like 1-3 hours", presenting the alleged disruption as a significant achievement.

Over the following months, the group continued adding targets across Europe and the United States. These included Luxembourg's national railway and government ministries, Polish defence companies and the Warsaw Stock Exchange, as well as US Federal Student Aid portals.

September–November 2026: The Expanding #Op Campaigns

The channel created in September 2026 became the most active source of campaign claims identified during this investigation.

  • t.me/darkstor******9 (Telegram ID: 4473764827)

From its first week, the channel began publishing a series of country-specific campaigns. Each followed the same naming convention, with an operation hashtag identifying the country and accompanying posts listing the alleged targets.

The campaigns covered Estonia, Germany, Poland, Romania, the Czech Republic, Italy, and France. The targets included government ministries, national portals, defence manufacturers, airports, transport services, financial institutions, and major technology companies.

The German campaign was particularly broad, with claims involving the Ministries of Justice and Defence, the Federal Foreign Office, regional transport services, city portals, federal courts, and the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA). The French campaign similarly extended beyond government websites to include energy company EDF, OVHcloud, and telecom operator La Poste Mobile.

Two campaigns in October stood out because they moved beyond the group's predominantly European targeting.

Under #OpSaudiArabia, Dark Storm claimed attacks against Saudi ministries, three international airports, and Bank Al-Bilad. The campaign was introduced with the phrase "support for Yemen", providing an explicit political message behind the targeting.

A few days later, the group published claims involving North Korean government and state media websites, including the national portal Naenara and the Pyongyang Times.

Alongside these national campaigns, Dark Storm continued targeting well-known online platforms. Its posts included claims involving LinkedIn, the Internet Archive, 4chan, DeviantArt, Pixiv, OnlyFans, and Archive of Our Own. US-based targets also appeared, including the New York Police Department and the Treasury's Electronic Federal Tax Payment System (EFTPS). The #OpUSA campaign also included Robinhood.

Campaign Overview

The following table consolidates the major campaigns identified across the group's Telegram channels during the investigation.

Campaign

Period

Example targets

Source channel

Platform claims

Oct 2025–Nov 2026

Reddit, Netflix, SpaceX, LinkedIn, 4chan, Internet Archive

All channels

#OpCanada

Oct 2025

Intelligence portal, regional airports, municipalities

Darkstorm****k

#OpEurope / #OpAsia

Mar 2026

Bank of Finland, Danish airports

Dark*Storm***m

#OpAustria

May 2026

Graz airport, BAWAG, Vienna Stock Exchange, power grid

Darkstorm****2

#OpUkraine

May–Oct 2026

City portals, Kyiv airport, defence plants, Parliament

Darkstorm***2, darkstorm****9

#OpUnitedKingdom

May 2026

Gatwick Airport, energy and drone companies

Darkstorm***2

#OpLuxembourg

Jun 2026

National railway, Interior and Digitalisation ministries

Darkstorm***2

#OpEstonia

Sep 2026

State portal, Ministry of Finance, Parliament

darkstorm***9

#OpGermany

Sep–Nov 2026

Ministries, BKA, federal courts, transport

darkstorm***9

#OpPoland

Sep 2026

Defence manufacturers, county administrations

darkstorm***9

#OpRomania

Sep 2026

Justice, Education, Health ministries

darkstorm***9

#OpCzechRepublic

Oct 2026

Police, Václav Havel Airport, government

darkstorm***9

#OpItaly

Sep–Oct 2026

Bank of Italy, ports, Ministry of Defence

darkstorm***9

#OpFrance

Oct–Nov 2026

Ministries, EDF, OVHcloud, La Poste Mobile

darkstorm***9

#OpSaudiArabia

Oct 2026

Ministries, airports, Bank AlBilad

darkstorm***9

North Korea

Oct 2026

Naenara portal, state media

darkstorm***9

#OpUSA

Oct 2026

NYPD, EFTPS, Robinhood

darkstorm***9

Assessing the Attack Claims

The volume and geographical spread of Dark Storm's claims are considerable. However, the evidence attached to these posts does not always establish the impact the group describes.

Dark Storm frequently uses Check-Host reports to demonstrate that a target is unreachable. These reports provide a snapshot of website availability from a limited number of probes. They do not independently establish whether a DDoS attack took place, how long an outage lasted, or whether the website was inaccessible for an unrelated reason.

The group's own use of the phrase "closed by geo" makes this distinction particularly important. A website restricting access based on geographical location should not automatically be treated as evidence of a successful attack.

There is also a precedent for overstating impact. During the widely publicised X incident in March 2025, the Check-Host screenshot shared by Dark Storm as proof showed a single X profile being targeted rather than demonstrating that the entire platform was unavailable.

Another pattern emerged when comparing Dark Storm's posts with announcements from other hacktivist groups. Several targets, including Luxembourg's national railway, the Corsica Linea maritime training center, and the BKA portal, appeared in Dark Storm's claims only days after NoName057(16) had published claims involving the same targets.

The timing raises questions about whether Dark Storm participated in the same operations or simply checked and republished targets already circulating within the wider hacktivist ecosystem. The Telegram posts alone are not enough to establish which explanation is correct.

The campaigns show a group that places considerable importance on visibility. Its targeting spans government institutions, financial organisations, transport services, and internationally recognised online platforms. The country-specific hashtags also give its activity the appearance of organised campaigns, although the available evidence does not establish the actual scale or impact of every claimed attack.

However, the group's activity is not limited to public attack announcements. Dark Storm also advertises DDoS services to paying customers, introducing a commercial side to its operations that deserves separate examination.

Hacktivism as a Storefront

Dark Storm's Telegram channels are not just used to publish attack claims. They also serve as a marketplace for the group's services.

Across the channels examined, advertisements appear regularly alongside operational announcements. The most frequently reposted advertisement is a fixed DDoS price list that has remained largely unchanged since at least October 2025.

Service

Advertised price

DDoS – 3 hours

$20

DDoS – 8 hours

$50

DDoS – 1 day

$100

DDoS – 1 week

$350

DDoS – 1 month

$600

Website database dumping

From $50

Payments are accepted exclusively in cryptocurrency, with potential buyers directed to GLITCH's sales account. The price list is usually accompanied by a short message inviting customers to make contact. Occasionally, the group introduces promotional offers to attract buyers, including a 50% discount available until the end of May 2026 and an eight-hour DDoS service advertised for $25 in late October 2026.

The sales contact has also changed over time, although the underlying Telegram accounts provide continuity:

  • @MRHEL****1 – Used until early 2026.
  • @glitch****1 – Used between May and July 2026.
  • @MRHEL*****2 – Used from July 2026 onwards.

The last two usernames belong to the same Telegram user ID, 8797265807, previously identified as GLITCH's sales account.

The pricing advertisements were not the only indication of commercial activity. In June 2026, Dark Storm pinned a broader service menu presenting itself as a team available for hire. Alongside DDoS attacks priced according to target size, the group advertised access to Instagram, Facebook, LinkedIn, X, and Telegram accounts, with prices starting at $250. Website database dumps were listed from $300.

From Attack Claims to Direct Payment Demands

The commercial side of Dark Storm's activity was not limited to advertising services in advance. In at least one instance, GLITCH directly connected an ongoing attack claim to a payment demand.

On 19 October 2025, he published a message stating that the DDoS activity against the Amino social app would stop if the company paid $5,000 in cryptocurrency. He followed this with a warning that anyone contacting him about Amino would be blocked.

A formal attack claim against Amino appeared on 22 October 2025, and the group returned to the same target in October 2026.

The sequence is significant because it shows GLITCH publicly using an alleged attack as leverage for a financial demand. This goes beyond the group's usual service advertisements and demonstrates how its hacktivist activity could also be used for direct monetisation.

A Broader Catalogue of Services

Over time, the group's advertisements expanded beyond DDoS attacks and website database dumping. Posts collected from its channels included offers involving:

  • Payment card data: An advertisement offering 100 credit cards at a low price in November 2025.
  • Hacking and information gathering: Services advertised using the wording "DD0S, DOX, H4CK database of site" in November 2025.
  • Surveillance access: Offers involving access to CCTV cameras in Germany and the United States in October 2026.
  • Advertising placements: Paid promotional slots on Dark Storm's Telegram channels, with enquiries directed to @MRHEL*****2.
  • Custom targets: A standing invitation for potential customers to "send target" directly to the sales account.

These advertisements suggest that Dark Storm was attempting to position itself as more than a group conducting politically motivated DDoS campaigns. Its channels also promoted a wider range of services and access that appealed to customers interested in different forms of cybercrime.

Friends in Loud Places

Dark Storm's Telegram activity shows that the group operates within a wider hacktivist network. Some relationships involve mutual promotion and joint attack claims, while others are based on shared campaign messaging or the redistribution of each other's content. The strongest connections identified during this investigation were with Team1914 and NoName057(16), although the nature of these relationships differs.

Team1914 and the Disrupt0r Alliance

The clearest two-way relationship was with Team1914*******l.

It first became visible in September 2026, when Team1914 began tagging #DarkStormTeam in its attack claims under a shared banner called Disrupt0r. When Dark Storm lost its Telegram channel that month, Team1914 announced that its alliance partner had been banned and circulated replacement links. Dark Storm subsequently returned the favour by sharing Team1914's backup channel links.

The relationship was also reflected in their attack claims. On 2 October 2026, Dark Storm claimed that it had taken Israel's Mossad website offline in collaboration with Team1914 and wiped. Team1914 published the same claim minutes later under the banner "DARKSTORM x TEAM_1914 x wiped".

Another indication of their overlap appeared that day, when Team1914 published claims involving CCTV systems in Japan, Germany, the Netherlands, and Italy, tagging them with #DarkStormTeam alongside #NoName057(16), #Disrupt0r, and RBL Leviathan Ghost. Less than a day later, Dark Storm began advertising access to CCTV cameras in Germany and the United States. The timing suggests a possible connection between the activity, but the available posts do not establish whether the groups shared access or were simply using the same branding.

NoName057(16): An Amplification Relationship

Dark Storm's connection with NoName057(16) appears different. Rather than a clearly declared alliance, the evidence points to a pattern of repeated amplification and alignment with the group's campaigns.

Since at least May 2026, Dark Storm's channels have regularly forwarded posts from NoName057(16)'s Russian and English-language channels. Dark Storm also adopted campaign hashtags associated with the group, including #NONAME057, #FuckEastwood, and #TimeOfRetribution.

This activity continued when NoName057(16)'s channels and DDoSia group were banned in October 2026. Dark Storm relayed the group's contact bot and replacement channel link within a day. It also forwarded the announcement of NoName057(16)'s Tor portal approximately three and a half hours after its launch on 26 October.

The relevant sources identified through Telegram Tracker were:

  • Russian-language channel - Telegram ID: 3087552512
  • English-language channel, "NNM057(16) eng vers" – Telegram ID: 3869927851
  • Tor portal – nnmo57***********************************jnid.onion

GLITCH's appearance in the DDoSia Project chat provides additional context, although it does not independently establish a formal operational relationship with NoName057(16). Overall, Dark Storm's repeated promotion of the group's channels and campaigns suggests close alignment and an active role in amplifying its activity. The precise nature of that relationship remains unclear and is examined further in the separate NoName057(16) report.

Other Declared Alliances and Connections

Several other groups publicly announced relationships with Dark Storm. These were mostly identified through announcements forwarded to Dark Storm's own channels:

  • ZagNet: On 31 October 2025, announced that it had officially entered an alliance with Dark Storm and would work with the group.
  • OverFlame: On 2 November 2025, announced its "unification" with Dark Storm in a Russian-language post.
  • PalachPro: On 15 November 2025, Dark Storm itself announced an alliance and shared the group's channel.
  • CyberTroll Team: On 9 October 2026, published a "CyberTroll x DarkStorm" announcement. Dark Storm subsequently reposted its claims involving Rome, France's ANSSI, and several Swedish cities.

Other names appeared more narrowly in the collected data. wiped was named alongside Team1914 in the Mossad claim, while BNCT1360 and RBL Leviathan Ghost appeared in Team1914's joint hashtags. These references establish campaign-level overlap, but not necessarily direct relationships with Dark Storm.

The relationships identified here vary considerably in strength. Team1914 has the clearest evidence of reciprocal cooperation, while NoName057(16) is repeatedly amplified by Dark Storm. Other groups appear through public alliance announcements, joint campaign references, or advertising exchanges. This distinction matters: appearing alongside Dark Storm in a post does not automatically make a group an operational partner.

Conclusion

When Dark Storm first attracted public attention, it was widely described as a pro-Palestinian hacktivist group. Its early threats focused on Israel, NATO members, and countries perceived as supporting Israel. This was also the image that shaped much of the coverage following the 2025 X outage.

By October 2026, however, the group's own Telegram presence was presenting a different identity. The link preview for its current channel described Dark Storm as a "Pro Russian group since 2023" and linked to its Wikipedia page.

This positioning is reflected in its recent activity. Dark Storm regularly forwards NoName057(16) material targeting European support for Ukraine, including posts about German military aid and NoName's "Tribunal" campaign against European politicians. It has also adopted NoName's campaign hashtags, while its declared ally OverFlame used explicitly pro-Russian messaging when announcing its partnership with Dark Storm.

Yet the group's activity does not fit neatly into a single political alignment. In September 2026, Dark Storm published a post featuring the Yemeni flag with the hashtag #YEMEN. The following month, it launched #OpSaudiArabia with the stated message "support for Yemen", targeting Saudi institutions and directing an insult at Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Israeli targets have also continued to appear in its attack claims.

The group also appears conscious of its public reputation. In October 2026, it reposted a March 2025 post by a security researcher who had claimed to identify the individuals behind the X outage. Dark Storm labelled the repost a "throwback" and mocked the researcher's attribution.

The available evidence points less to a clearly documented change in ideology than to a shift in the groups and causes Dark Storm chooses to associate itself with. Its recent messaging shows stronger alignment with the pro-Russian hacktivist ecosystem, particularly NoName057(16), while its activity continues to draw on other geopolitical grievances. Whether this reflects a genuine ideological shift or a strategic effort to expand its alliances and audience cannot be established from the Telegram activity alone.

Editorial Note

Dark web investigations rarely provide a complete or definitive picture. Public claims can be exaggerated, identities difficult to verify, and relationships open to more than one interpretation. This case demonstrates how StealthMole's historical Telegram data and cross-account tracking can help investigators follow activity across channel bans, account changes, and shifting alliances, while keeping those uncertainties visible rather than treating every connection as proof.

To access the unmasked report or full details, please reach out to us separately.

Contact us: support@stealthmole.com





Labels: ,

Learn more about StealthMole

Talk to our team of experts today to learn how you can manage your dark web exposure.
Request demo More Reports

Share this report