From Exploit Tools to Account Sales: Mapping the Operational Model of ‘Quessts’

The underground economy has evolved far beyond simple malware distribution. Today, exploit tools operate as structured products: packaged, branded, updated, and marketed across multiple platforms. What once circulated quietly in private circles now moves fluidly between GitHub repositories, Telegram channels, archived forum threads, and niche communities.

Exploit development is no longer confined to advanced threat actors. It has become accessible, modular, and increasingly commercialized. Tools are advertised with changelogs, version numbers, installation guides, and “educational” disclaimers. Distribution strategies mirror legitimate software releases: support servers, video tutorials, and update announcements across channels.

At the same time, these tools rarely exist in isolation. The same actors who develop or distribute exploit-based utilities often diversify: moving into account sales, modded applications, digital goods markets, and auxiliary services. The boundaries between technical experimentation, opportunistic monetization, and structured underground commerce have blurred.

What makes this ecosystem particularly interesting is not just the tools themselves, but the operational model behind them. How are these tools promoted? Where are they discussed? How are reputations built? And how does an actor transition from releasing an exploit-themed utility to selling verified accounts or digital access products?

This report does not focus solely on a single tool. Instead, it maps an operational pattern, tracing how one online persona navigates exploit development, distribution channels, community engagement, and monetization pathways across platforms.

Initial Investigation: APK Crypt Service and Android Evasion

The investigation began within an Android-focused services thread rather than a standalone malware drop.

While monitoring exploit-related discussions, a post on cracked.sh surfaced advertising an “APK Crypt Service – Bypass Play Protect.” The offering positioned itself as a technical service designed to modify or encrypt Android applications in ways that could evade Google Play Protect detection mechanisms.

• https://cracked.sh/Thread-A*****************T

The thread was published under the alias “Quessts.” The thread also introduced a recurring visual identifier: a red Q logo associated with the alias. This branding would later appear across multiple platforms, suggesting intentional identity consistency.

Unlike one-off exploit releases, this post suggested a recurring operational model. It presented itself as a service: implying repeat clients, ongoing demand, and a monetization structure built around evasion. Rather than distributing a specific malicious payload, the offering focused on enabling others to deploy applications with reduced detection rates.

This distinction matters.

Crypting services sit at a strategic layer of the Android underground ecosystem. They act as facilitators: supporting modded apps, gray-market distributions, and potentially malicious campaigns by helping them bypass automated security filters. Even without direct malware publication, such services contribute to broader threat enablement.

At this stage, the key questions shifted:

Was this Android-focused service an isolated offering? Or was it part of a broader pattern of exploit development and commercialization under the same alias?

The next step was to examine where else the name “Quessts” appeared and whether similar tooling or services were being promoted beyond cracked.sh.

Pivot Through Leaked Data: Darkweb Tracker Findings

Following the discovery of the APK crypt service on cracked.sh, the next step was to pivot on the alias “Quessts” within StealthMole’s Darkweb Tracker.

This broader query returned hundreds of results: ranging from archived forum mentions to leaked datasets and exposed files. Rather than focusing on forum threads immediately, attention shifted to structured leak artifacts that could contain embedded identifiers.

Among these results were three leaked documents that referenced a GitHub repository associated with the same alias:

• https://github.com/*****/RD-Bypass-AV

The repository was described within the leaked material as a Rubber Ducky script capable of downloading an executable externally while bypassing Windows antivirus protections and adding exclusions.

This finding was significant for two reasons.

First, it demonstrated that “Quessts” was associated not only with Android crypting services, but also with Windows-focused evasion tooling. This suggested broader exploit experimentation beyond mobile ecosystems.

Second, the GitHub URL served as a pivot anchor.

Rather than relying solely on forum presence, the investigation now had a direct infrastructure artifact tied to the alias.

From the leaked document reference, the investigation expanded to the full GitHub profile:

• https://github.com/******

Consistent with the other platforms reviewed, this profile features the same red “Q” logo as its profile image. It also includes links to Quessts’ YouTube and Twitter (now X) accounts. However, both linked accounts are currently inactive.

• YouTube: https://YouTube.com/Quessts
• Twitter: https://x.com/Quessts

At this stage, the operational footprint began to widen. What initially appeared as an Android-focused crypting service was now linked to publicly accessible exploit-oriented code repositories.

The next step was to analyze the repositories themselves and determine whether this was an isolated script or part of a broader pattern of tool development and distribution.

GitHub Profile Expansion: From AV Bypass to Snapify

While reviewing the profile further, another project stood out: Snapify.

• https://github.com/******/Snapify

Unlike RD-Bypass-AV, which targeted endpoint security bypass, Snapify was positioned as a Snapchat exploit tool capable of artificially increasing Snap scores. The repository included structured installation instructions, platform compatibility notes, and usage documentation.

The layout resembled a conventional software release rather than an informal proof-of-concept drop. Dependencies were outlined. Execution instructions were clearly documented. The tone suggested accessibility, lowering the barrier for users who may not possess advanced technical knowledge.

This progression reveals an important operational shift:

• The cracked.sh thread introduced an Android evasion service.
• The leaked documents revealed Windows AV bypass tooling.
• The GitHub profile demonstrated publicly accessible exploit utilities.

At this point, the investigation was no longer confined to Android crypting alone. The alias “Quessts” appeared to be operating across multiple exploit domains: mobile evasion, endpoint bypass, and social media abuse tooling.

Forum Amplification: Snapify and Cross-Community Promotion

After identifying Snapify on GitHub, the next step was to determine whether the tool remained confined to open-source hosting or if it was being actively promoted within underground communities.

References to Snapify surfaced in forum discussions outside GitHub, indicating that the project was being distributed and discussed within exploit-oriented spaces.

• https://leaks.so/threads/%E2%9C%A8snapify***********9476/

Although the thread was initiated by a different user (“TheSickness”), the post explicitly credited Quessts as the developer of the tool. The language mirrored the GitHub repository’s positioning, including references to updates and usage disclaimers.

This is a critical transition point.

Snapify was no longer just a repository, it was circulating within underground communities. Version updates were mentioned. Installation guidance was shared. The project was framed as a free exploit utility with ongoing improvements.

This pattern reflects deliberate promotion rather than passive hosting.

The recurring use of disclaimers, framing the tool as educational and distancing the developer from misuse, also mirrored earlier language patterns observed in other threads associated with the alias. The consistency suggests intentional messaging across platforms.

Beyond Snapify, additional forum activity under the same alias began to surface across multiple platforms, including:

• https://breached.vc/U******s
• https://breached.to/U******s
• https://breached.co/U******s
• https://cracked.io/Q*******s
• https://raidforums.com/U******s
• https://www.nulled.to/user/4******s

The presence of the same alias across multiple major underground forums indicated long-term embedded participation rather than opportunistic posting.

At this stage, the investigation shifted toward mapping the breadth of activity across these platforms, including tool releases, account sales, and instructional content, to better understand whether Snapify was one of many offerings under a broader operational strategy.

Operational Diversification: Tool Releases and Account Sales

The broader forum footprint under the alias “Quessts” revealed activity extending well beyond Snapify or Android crypting services.

On RaidForums, multiple threads were identified spanning different categories, including exploit tooling, instructional content, and direct marketplace sales.

One thread focused on a leaked DDoS script, referencing “SAPHYRA” and claiming prior high-profile usage. The post included a disclaimer advising users not to misuse the tool. This language pattern mirrored disclaimers observed in other posts linked to the alias, positioning releases as informational or educational while still distributing operational tooling.

• https://raidforums.com/Thread-SAPHYRA*************T

Additional activity on RaidForums demonstrated instructional engagement. Threads discussing Linux installation and technical setup indicated an effort to build credibility within the community beyond pure sales activity.

More notably, a marketplace-oriented thread advertised the sale of fully verified Paxful accounts:

• https://raidforums.com/Thread-SELLING******PAXFUL****ACCOUNTS

The post described accounts verified with identification documents, phone numbers, and address details. Contact methods listed in the thread included:

• Discord: Q******1
• Telegram: @Q******s

This artifact is significant because it links the exploit developer persona to direct account monetization. Unlike Snapify, which operated as a publicly distributed tool, the Paxful thread demonstrates structured revenue generation through access sales.

In parallel, additional content under the alias included Android-related modifications and adult cam tool releases, indicating involvement in modded application ecosystems:

• https://raidforums.com/Thread-Pu************18

The combination of exploit tools, account sales, and modded applications reflects a hybrid operational model. Rather than specializing in a single niche, the alias appears to move fluidly between:

• Exploit development
• Tool distribution
• Account marketplace activity
• Community engagement

At this point, the investigation began to show a recurring pattern: consistent alias usage, recurring contact infrastructure, and multi-category participation across underground forums.

Real-Time Distribution: Telegram Presence and Community Activity

After mapping forum-based activity, the next logical pivot was Telegram, a platform frequently used for exploit promotion, file distribution, and direct client communication.

A Telegram account using the same alias was identified. The account displayed consistent branding, including the same logo previously observed in forum threads. This continuity reinforced identity persistence across platforms.

• https://t.me/Q********s

Beyond the direct user profile, references to Snapify were located in Telegram channels where installation instructions and promotional messaging were shared. One such channel was:

• https://t.me/ev******t

In this channel, Snapify was promoted alongside its GitHub repository:

• https://github.com/*******/Snapify

The messaging included update references and installation guidance, mirroring content found in forum posts. This suggests deliberate cross-platform amplification rather than organic redistribution.

Additional activity was observed within a Telegram channel titled “Doxbin,” where the alias engaged in discussions and technical exchanges:

• https://t.me/+V**************eM

Participation extended beyond tool promotion. The account was active in discussions within exploit-focused and bug bounty groups, offering technical input and engaging with other users. This behavior indicates community embedding rather than purely transactional presence.

Notably, within Telegram conversations, references to Sellix.io were made in the context of purchasing digital goods such as VMware keys. This aligns with earlier Sellix storefront mentions tied to the alias and reinforces monetization familiarity.

Telegram activity demonstrates three important operational characteristics:

• Direct tool promotion beyond static forums
• Real-time engagement with exploit-oriented communities
• Continued use of consistent alias branding

By this stage, the alias “Quessts” appeared active across:

• Underground forums
• GitHub repositories
• Telegram channels
• Marketplace ecosystems

The investigation was no longer centered on a single exploit or service offering. Instead, it revealed a recurring pattern of tool release, cross-platform promotion, and monetization under a unified online persona.

Monetization Layer: Cryptocurrency Activity and Sellix Infrastructure

Beyond forum promotion and tool distribution, the alias “Quessts” demonstrated structured monetization behavior.

On the cracked.sh profile, a Bitcoin address was publicly listed:

• BTC Address: 1Ag*********************rt

Blockchain analysis of this address revealed transaction activity between 2019 and 2021. The wallet received multiple small-value transactions consistent with low-cost service payments. The cumulative transaction pattern suggested repeated inbound transfers rather than a single lump-sum payment, aligning with the pricing model of services such as APK crypting.

Notably, the wallet balance was later fully transferred out, indicating consolidation behavior rather than passive holding.

In parallel, a Sellix storefront associated with the alias was identified:

• https://q*********s.sellix.io

Sellix is commonly used for selling digital goods, keys, accounts, and software tools. The presence of a dedicated storefront reinforces the service-oriented operational model observed in forum threads. Rather than relying solely on private messaging or informal transfers, the storefront suggests structured productization.

Overall, the BTC wallet and Sellix infrastructure demonstrate that the activity under the alias was not limited to experimentation or reputation-building. It reflected a revenue-generating model integrated into underground commerce platforms.

Identity Correlation: Leaked Datasets and Email Artifacts

With cross-platform activity established across forums, GitHub, and Telegram, the investigation returned to StealthMole’s Darkweb Tracker to examine whether the alias “Quessts” appeared within structured leak datasets.

A broader query of the username surfaced hundreds of results, including database leaks and archived SQL files. While many references were repetitive or contextually unrelated, several structured leak files contained identifiable artifacts.

As mentioned earlier, three leaked documents referenced the GitHub repository. These references reinforced the association between the alias and Windows AV bypass tooling. However, they did not yet reveal personal identifiers.

Further analysis of additional leaked datasets produced more concrete linkage. Within a RaidForums SQL leak, a user record under the alias “Quessts” contained the following artifacts:

• Email: m********1@gmail.com
• Discord: Q********1
• Date of Birth (as stored in database): 6-9-2000

The presence of the Discord handle Q*****1 was particularly significant, as the same contact information appeared in earlier marketplace threads, including the Paxful account sales post.

This established a high-confidence linkage between:

• Forum alias “Quessts”
• Discord contact: Q*********1
• Email: m********1@gmail.com

To evaluate further correlation, the email address m*******1@gmail.com was analyzed through StealthMole’s Combo Binder. The results indicated credential exposure, including a password string matching the alias “Quessts.”

However, additional datasets revealed a second email address exhibiting naming similarity:

• al******f2002@gmail.com

Initially, this appeared to be a naming similarity. However, further analysis significantly strengthened the correlation.

When al*****f2002@gmail.com was queried in StealthMole’s Darkweb Tracker, a leaked document was identified in which the email was directly associated with the username: Quessts. This moved the linkage beyond similarity into documented alias association.

Additional artifacts extracted from the same dataset included two IP addresses:

• 1*8.**6.**9.**2 (Kuwait)
• 3*.*9.**9.**2

The geographic reference to Kuwait is notable when viewed alongside the broader identity indicators, though IP-based inference remains limited without temporal validation.

Further convergence was identified through an associated avatar URL found in the forum dump:

• https://i.imgur.com/U******0.jpg?dateline=1628550237

When accessed, the image displayed the same red circular “Q” logo consistently observed across:

• Cracked.sh thread branding
• GitHub profile imagery
• Telegram profile imagery

This visual continuity strengthens infrastructure-level identity persistence.

In addition, the email al*******f2002@gmail.com was found linked to the Sellix storefront:

• https://sellix.io/Quessts

This directly connects the secondary email cluster to the monetization infrastructure previously attributed to the alias. Additional correlation further indicated that the email al******f2002@gmail.com was associated with a Twitter account:

• https://twitter.com/Mo*******f2_

Although the account is currently inactive, the username suggests a possible personal identity reference consistent with the naming pattern observed in both Gmail addresses.

Conclusion

The investigation into the alias “Quessts” reveals a consistent and structured operational pattern rather than isolated experimentation. Beginning with an Android-focused APK crypting service, the activity expanded into Windows AV bypass tooling, social media exploit utilities, account sales, and cross-platform promotion.

What stands out is not any single tool, but the model itself. The same alias appeared across forums, GitHub repositories, Telegram channels, and monetization platforms with consistent branding and recurring contact infrastructure. Exploit development, community engagement, and revenue generation operated in parallel.

Identity analysis further strengthened the case. Leaked datasets linked the alias to multiple email addresses, shared avatar artifacts, IP references, and storefront infrastructure, forming a converging identity cluster rather than fragmented associations. While cautious attribution discipline remains necessary, the weight of overlapping technical and credential-based artifacts supports a unified operational persona.

The case illustrates how modern underground operators do not confine themselves to a single niche. Instead, they move fluidly between exploit tooling, account marketplaces, and distribution ecosystems, leveraging visibility and reputation to sustain activity across multiple platforms.

Editorial Note

Investigations within underground ecosystems rarely offer absolute certainty. Aliases evolve, datasets are fragmented, and identity overlaps can blur boundaries between confirmed linkage and plausible association. This case demonstrates how StealthMole enables structured mapping of operational behavior even when full attribution remains unresolved.

To access the unmasked report or full details, please reach out to us separately.

Contact us: support@stealthmole.com

Beyond Defacements: Expanding Digital Ecosystem of LulzSec Black

The name LulzSec carries weight in cybersecurity circles. The original group, active in 2011, became infamous for high-profile breaches, media spectacle, and a brand of chaotic, attention-driven hacking. But more than a decade later, a new entity using a similar name has surfaced and despite the branding overlap, its motivations and operational behavior tell a very different story.

LulzSec Black is not a revival of the original collective. It does not operate in the same context, nor does it pursue the same type of targets. Instead, it presents itself as an ideologically aligned hacktivist group, blending cyber intrusions, defacements, and data leak claims with overt political messaging. Its branding heavily incorporates pro-Palestinian symbolism, religious references, and rhetoric positioning cyber activity as part of a broader resistance narrative.

At first glance, the group appears to be another defacement-focused actor riding geopolitical tensions for visibility. However, a deeper look reveals something more structured. Across dark web forums, Telegram channels, bot infrastructures, and even mainstream social media platforms, LulzSec Black has developed a multi-layered digital presence. Their activity extends beyond website defacements into data sales, tool distribution, cross-channel amplification, and coordinated messaging campaigns.

One recurring pattern stands out early in the investigation: a consistent focus on Indian entities, alongside messaging targeting Israel. Whether ideological alignment, opportunistic targeting, or both, this trend becomes increasingly difficult to ignore as their footprint expands across platforms.

This report maps that footprint, from dark forum postings and defacement archives to Telegram ecosystems and monetization attempts, to understand how LulzSec Black operates, communicates, and sustains its presence online.

Incident Trigger and Initial Investigation

The investigation began with a straightforward query inside StealthMole’s Dark Web Tracker using the keyword “LulzSec Black.” The initial search returned multiple indexed posts from DarkForums, immediately indicating that the actor was active on at least one established underground discussion platform.

One of the relevant findings was a July 2025 thread posted by the user “lulzsecblack” on:

• https://darkforums.**/Thread-Document-Hacked-Company-M*-F*S-INDIA

In this post, the actor claimed to have breached M** F****s India, describing the company as an engineering and medical systems manufacturer. The thread included two publicly accessible file-sharing links:

• https://gofile.io/d/d****f
• https://gofile.io/d/t****b

The post stated that approximately 1.4 TB of data had been exfiltrated, with a small portion released and the remainder offered for sale. The author also embedded a Telegram channel link:

• https://t.me/+mC1MrRnDp5FjNmQ0

And a contact bot:

• @LulzSec*****Bot

This combination of public leak samples, private sale channel, and automated bot contact indicated a structured monetization pathway rather than a purely ideological disclosure.

Further review of the same DarkForums user profile revealed an additional thread:

• https://darkforums.**/Thread-Document-Indian-Nuclear-Reactors-and-Chemicals-Company-hacked-C*******r

In this case, the group claimed to have accessed databases related to an Indian nuclear and chemicals entity. Unlike the MAP Filters incident, no direct download links were provided. Instead, access to the data required purchase via Telegram bot contact, suggesting tiered exposure tactics, partial public proof in some cases, controlled access in others.

During this stage of the investigation, a second DarkForums domain surfaced:

• https://darkforums.st/User-lulzsecblack

The presence of the same username across domains, consistent branding imagery, and identical Telegram contact details strengthened attribution confidence.

At this point, two patterns became clear:

• India appeared repeatedly as a target of claimed intrusions.
• Each forum claims redirected traffic toward Telegram infrastructure.

This redirection became the next logical pivot in the investigation.

Telegram Infrastructure and Ecosystem Expansion

With multiple DarkForums posts redirecting users to Telegram, the investigation shifted to StealthMole’s Telegram Tracker to examine the channel linked in the breach announcements:

• https://t.me/+mC1MrRnDp5FjNmQ0

Although the channel was no longer publicly accessible at the time of investigation, StealthMole’s historical indexing capability enabled a reconstruction of its activity. Archived records showed multilingual messaging in Arabic, English, and Hebrew, along with repeated references to operations targeting Israel and India. The channel also circulated content from other militant-aligned Telegram channels, reinforcing its ideological positioning.

The last indexed message in this channel dated back to May 2025, suggesting either voluntary shutdown, administrative action, or migration to alternative infrastructure.

Further pivoting from this channel revealed additional Telegram nodes associated with the same branding:

• https://t.me/Luzsec_Black (chat channel)
• https://t.me/LulzSec_Black_Tools (tools distribution channel)
• @LulzSec*******Bot
• @lulzsecblack2_bot
• @ab*******d_co_bot

The tools channel contained an Arabic-language announcement stating that, in response to requests from followers, the group had created and would distribute a dedicated DDoS attack tool through a specialized channel. This marked a notable shift from messaging and breach claims toward operational enablement.

The chat channel introduced another layer: community interaction. It included livestream references and forwarded operational updates, indicating attempts to build a participatory audience rather than maintain a one-way broadcast structure.

During Telegram pivoting, additional invite links surfaced, including:

• https://t.me/+5tOXpaGX8o8xNDc8
• https://t.me/+Z4TymJU-X4pkYTZk
• https://t.me/+ghJlzrgSBXs0OWFk

Several of these links had expired, but their repeated appearance across defacement archives and related Telegram channels suggested a pattern of infrastructure rotation, a common resilience tactic among hacktivist groups operating under platform enforcement pressure.

Parallel investigation identified an active Instagram account:

• https://www.instagram.com/lulz******k

With approximately 12.7K followers, the account directed traffic toward Telegram channels, indicating a deliberate funnel from mainstream social media into encrypted communication environments.

• https://t.me/Lu********k

Taken together, the Telegram and social media mapping revealed that LulzSec Black’s operations were not confined to isolated breach announcements. Instead, they maintained a layered digital ecosystem consisting of broadcast channels, chat groups, bot-driven contact points, tool distribution hubs, and public-facing recruitment pathways.

At this stage of the investigation, the group’s structure appeared increasingly deliberate rather than sporadic.

Defacement Campaigns and Ideological Framing

While forum posts and Telegram channels revealed the group’s communication structure, defacement archives provided direct evidence of operational activity.

A review of entries on Mirror-H showed a defacement page attributed to “LulzSec Black.” The defaced page prominently displayed the group’s logo alongside pro-Palestinian imagery and explicit references to “Palestinian Islamic Resistance [ Jenin Battalion ].” The page also embedded Telegram links, reinforcing the pattern observed earlier, each operational act redirected attention back to their communication channels.

• https://mirror-h.org/mirror/5927343/

The messaging within the defacement was not neutral or generic. It incorporated religious declarations, resistance-oriented slogans, and references to militant-aligned narratives. The branding was consistent with what appeared across Telegram and DarkForums: identical logo styling, repeated bot contact references, and the same ideological framing.

This consistency is important. Many defacement actors rely on disposable branding or opportunistic messaging. In contrast, LulzSec Black demonstrated uniform visual identity and repeated narrative themes across platforms. The defacement was not an isolated technical act, it functioned as amplification.

Notably, Telegram invite links embedded in defacement pages were later observed being circulated across related Telegram channels. Although several of these links have since expired, their cross-appearance suggests centralized coordination rather than spontaneous or unaffiliated use of the group’s name.

• https://t.me/+5tOXpaGX8o8xNDc8

The defacement activity also aligned with previously observed targeting patterns. Several claims and references pointed toward Indian entities, while broader messaging consistently positioned Israel as a rhetorical adversary. Whether all claimed breaches are independently verifiable remains outside the scope of this section; however, the messaging pattern itself is consistent and deliberate.

At this stage, LulzSec Black appears to use defacement as a signaling mechanism, a way to project ideological alignment, recruit attention, and funnel traffic into controlled communication spaces. It is less about the single compromised website and more about the narrative ecosystem built around it.

Monetization Strategy and the Hybrid Hacktivism Model

Although LulzSec Black presents itself as an ideologically driven cyber collective, activity on DarkForums introduces a parallel dimension: monetization.

The July 2025 post claiming a breach of M** F*****s India included publicly accessible sample data alongside two GoFile download links. The remaining data, reportedly totaling over a terabyte, was offered for sale via Telegram contact. In a separate DarkForums thread concerning an alleged breach of an Indian nuclear and chemicals entity, no public sample was provided at all, instead, interested parties were directed to purchase access directly through the Telegram bot.

This distinction is telling.

In one case, partial exposure appears designed to establish credibility. In the other, exclusivity appears designed to maximize sale value. Both methods follow a structured sales logic rather than a purely ideological disclosure model.

The repeated inclusion of Telegram bots, particularly @LulzSec*****Bot, reinforces this assessment. Bots reduce friction in communication, automate inquiries, and enable scalable interaction. The presence of a secondary bot (@lulzsecblack2_bot) suggests redundancy or operational continuity planning.

The tools channel further complicates the picture. The announcement of a custom-built DDoS tool for followers signals another potential revenue or influence pathway. Even if tools are distributed freely, they function as capability amplification, expanding operational reach through community participation.

Taken together, these elements suggest a hybrid operational identity:

• Ideological messaging and militant-aligned rhetoric
• Defacement activity for visibility and signaling
• Data breach claims targeting strategic entities
• Structured data sales via forum and bot infrastructure
• Tool distribution to followers

This model blends hacktivist narrative with financially motivated behavior. It does not fit neatly into a single category. The group appears to leverage geopolitical rhetoric while simultaneously operating within established cybercrime market dynamics.

The consistency of this pattern across multiple platforms indicates deliberate structuring rather than opportunistic posting. LulzSec Black does not simply claim attacks; it builds funnels: from defacement to Telegram, from forum posts to bots, from propaganda to monetization.

This hybrid positioning may explain the group’s sustained activity across 2024–2025 and its ability to maintain visibility even as individual channels are suspended or expire.

Conclusion

LulzSec Black presents itself under a familiar name, but its operational behavior reflects a distinctly modern structure. Unlike the original 2011 LulzSec collective, which thrived on spectacle and short-lived disruption, this iteration demonstrates sustained cross-platform coordination and layered digital presence.

The investigation traced a consistent pattern: DarkForums breach claims redirecting to Telegram channels; defacement pages embedding the same contact infrastructure; bot-driven communication pathways; tool distribution channels; and an active Instagram account funneling public audiences into encrypted spaces. Across these platforms, India repeatedly appeared in breach claims, while Israel featured prominently in ideological messaging. Whether opportunistic or strategically aligned, the targeting pattern is difficult to ignore.

More importantly, LulzSec Black does not operate as a purely ideological propaganda outlet nor as a conventional financially motivated breach actor. Instead, it blends both models. Defacements function as visibility signals. Forum posts serve as credibility markers. Telegram bots facilitate transactions. Tool distribution encourages participation. The ecosystem is interconnected.

What emerges is not a loose collection of online claims, but a structured digital footprint: one that evolves across domains, migrates when links expire, and maintains consistent branding throughout. Beyond defacements, the group has built a networked presence designed to sustain attention, coordinate messaging, and monetize access.

Editorial Note

Attribution in cyber investigations is rarely absolute. Online identities can fragment, migrate, or be imitated, and infrastructure often shifts in response to platform enforcement. This case demonstrates how systematic tracking, across dark web forums, defacement archives, Telegram ecosystems, and social media funnels, helps reduce uncertainty by focusing on repeated identifiers, behavioral consistency, and cross-platform linkage. The findings presented here reflect the observable digital footprint of LulzSec Black at the time of investigation, recognizing that cyber actors and narratives continue to evolve.

To access the unmasked report or full details, please reach out to us separately.

Contact us: support@stealthmole.com

Snuff Cinema: Mirror Network and Wallet Infrastructure Analysis

The term “snuff film” historically refers to content that claims to depict real acts of extreme violence or death for entertainment or commercial gain. While the concept gained public attention decades ago through urban legends and exploitation media, the dark web has repurposed the term as branding for platforms that advertise extreme, violent, and illicit material to paying users.

On Tor, websites using names such as “Snuff Cinema” typically position themselves as exclusive libraries of prohibited content. These platforms often rely on shock-driven marketing language, claims of authenticity, and Bitcoin-based access models. Payment is usually framed as an “entrance fee,” granting temporary download access through a controlled gateway. Whether all advertised material is genuine or exaggerated for marketing purposes varies from case to case but the infrastructure supporting these sites is often deliberate and financially structured.

Snuff Cinema follows this pattern. It presents itself as a subscription-style platform hosted on onion domains, requiring Bitcoin payment before access is granted. Its messaging emphasizes exclusivity, authenticity, and short-term access windows tied to specific wallets.

This report does not assess the authenticity of the content being advertised. Instead, it examines the technical and financial footprint behind the operation: mapping its Tor mirrors, identifying associated Bitcoin wallets, analyzing payment structures, and tracing how the platform appears to maintain continuity across multiple domains and channels.

Incident Trigger and Initial Investigation

The investigation did not begin as a targeted operation. The domain surfaced during routine dark web monitoring within StealthMole’s Darkweb Tracker module. At the time, it appeared as another onion service using provocative branding, “SNUFF CINEMA”, accompanied by messaging designed to attract users seeking extreme and illicit content.

• ekvo****************************************2ijad.onion

The payment page displayed a single Bitcoin wallet and a specific amount required for entry. That detail prompted a closer look. Using StealthMole, additional wallet identifiers began to surface in association with the same domain.

At this stage, there was no clear indication that the platform extended beyond this onion address. However, the presence of multiple wallets tied to a single access gateway suggested that further investigation was necessary. What began as a routine domain review transitioned into a structured infrastructure mapping exercise.

Initial Wallet Enumeration and Financial Indicators

A closer review of the payment gateway revealed that the wallet displayed for access was:

• bc1q********************************2tmt

The amount requested at the time was 0.00013491 BTC, with the page stating that the address would remain valid for 24 hours and that payment would unlock downloads for the same period.

Using StealthMole’s artifact extraction and wallet correlation capabilities, four additional Bitcoin addresses were identified in connection with the same onion domain:

• bc1qg**********************************8hx
• bc1qu**********************************8gy
• bc1qq**********************************0ht
• bc1qe**********************************ucx

At first glance, the presence of five separate Bitcoin wallets tied to a single domain raised questions. Were these rotated per session? Were they placeholders? Or were they distributed across different access paths?

Blockchain review at this stage showed no recorded transaction activity across these addresses. The absence of movement did not immediately clarify their role, but it did suggest that the financial component of the site required deeper scrutiny. Either the infrastructure was newly deployed, or the active payment flow was occurring elsewhere.

That uncertainty prompted a broader pivot. If the wallets attached to this domain were inactive, it was necessary to determine whether other instances of “Snuff Cinema” were operating in parallel, possibly handling active payments under a different onion address.

This marked the point where the investigation moved beyond a single domain assessment and into structured expansion mapping.

Secondary Domain Discovery and Active Wallet Identification

To determine whether the inactive wallets on the initial domain reflected a newly deployed setup or only one segment of a larger operation, further pivoting was conducted using StealthMole’s domain correlation tools. This led to the discovery of another onion address carrying identical branding:

• snuffnu56nh7tpvi.onion

The structure of the site mirrored the previously observed domain. It followed the same subscription-style access model and directed users to a Bitcoin payment page before granting entry. However, this instance displayed a different wallet:

• 1QGs************************9mK

Unlike the wallets associated with the first domain, this address showed recorded blockchain activity. It had received funds in a single transaction dated 2018-11-16 and had not moved those funds afterward. The wallet remained dormant but historically active.

This discovery introduced an important shift in perspective. The existence of two domains under the same branding, each tied to separate wallets and exhibiting different transaction patterns, suggested segmentation rather than duplication. The first domain appeared operational but financially inactive, while the second reflected historical payment activity.

At this stage, the platform could no longer be viewed as a single-entry Tor service. Instead, it began to resemble a distributed structure where different domains may have served different operational phases or user entry points.

Expansion of the Mirror Network

The discovery of a second domain carrying identical branding suggested that Snuff Cinema was not confined to a single onion address. To determine the scale of deployment, further domain mapping was conducted using StealthMole’s darkweb tracker.

During this process, a series of onion domains surfaced in connection with snuffnu56nh7tpvi.onion, presented as alternate access points. These included:

• snufflzsdd47y3lgkw664copfvofqujxjbr47vc267hork7u3pd4yiad.onion
• epmr53iqsfgmnvhy4p5u3ot3kyrzzdh7dilkhjrylzvl6xu52pxvxhqd.onion
• 5od5c***********************************************2sqd.onion
• ekvot***********************************************ihyd.onion
• fkthke7sggwq2zi7ap6iminrr7p4nvequs6qog4ab3xgibwishn5spad.onion
• oqr7dat3rbkhmrl2yemd6k4vqp64di4dxpdongmcocffltzfuh5vkcid.onion
• 5od5cgx6butoeasjpgyk753uwy6av3jlmfofrehemkdmhqnegtnqzbid.onion
• t33birhamm44ltrqtniq2v5wjjynpt4kv64s5qgkk5dxbuq6jaa5vcqd.onion
• tnzicmv55dmqhfzemnfef6nzg6dmqyyo3j56bxlo554ybmg3ls4jh4qd.onion
• vxgilcmvjhsgehrh.onion

The consistency of branding across these domains indicated intentional replication rather than unrelated usage of similar terminology. The presence of multiple mirrors is a common resilience strategy on Tor, allowing operators to maintain accessibility even if individual domains become unstable or blocked.

What stood out during this mapping process was that the domains were not randomly generated in isolation. Some exhibited structural similarities in naming, while others appeared entirely distinct. This mix of patterns suggested deliberate domain management rather than automated cloning.

At this stage of the investigation, the scope had clearly expanded beyond two isolated onion sites. Snuff Cinema appeared to operate through a distributed mirror network, with multiple entry points potentially serving the same underlying platform.

The next step was to examine whether these mirrors shared financial infrastructure, specifically, whether they reused Bitcoin wallets or introduced new ones per domain.

Wallet Diversification Across Mirror Domains

With the mirror structure established, attention shifted to the financial layer behind these additional domains. If the mirrors were simply redundant access points, one might expect them to reuse the same payment infrastructure. Instead, StealthMole analysis revealed that several mirrors introduced entirely new Bitcoin wallets.

For example, the domain:

• 5od5c******************************************2sqd.onion

was associated with five separate Bitcoin addresses:

• bc1q2*********************************fz4
• bc1q0*********************************jan
• bc1qq********************************lpdh
• bc1qx*********************************88n
• bc1q2*********************************5lk

Similarly, the mirror:

• oqr7dat3rbkhmrl2yemd6k4vqp64di4dxpdongmcocffltzfuh5vkcid.onion

displayed a different wallet:

• bc1qj******************************tz3

Another mirror:

• 5od5cgx6butoeasjpgyk753uwy6av3jlmfofrehemkdmhqnegtnqzbid.onion

was tied to:

• bc1qdx***************************3z8

At this stage, most of these addresses showed no transaction history. However, one mirror stood apart.

The domain:

• snufflzsdd47y3lgkw664copfvofqujxjbr47vc267hork7u3pd4yiad.onion

was associated with the wallet:

• 3Myb********************************dux

This wallet had recorded blockchain activity, with funds received and later transferred out, leaving a zero balance. The payment amount requested on that mirror was 0.00042321 BTC, a noticeable variation from the amount observed on the initial domain.

Another domain within the mirror network:

• ekvot****************************************ihyd.onion

introduced fifteen additional Bitcoin addresses, one of which showed a pattern of receiving funds and transferring them out shortly afterward.

• bc1q***************************uu

Taken together, these findings indicated that Snuff Cinema did not rely on a single static wallet across its infrastructure. Instead, individual mirrors appeared capable of operating with distinct Bitcoin addresses, some dormant and others briefly active. The variation in requested payment amounts further suggested that each mirror functioned as an independent financial entry point rather than merely redirecting traffic to a central wallet.

Historical Wallet Activity and External Exposure

While most wallets identified across the mirror network showed limited or no transaction history, two addresses stood out due to their activity patterns and broader exposure.

The first was linked to the mirror domain:

• vxgilcmvjhsgehrh.onion

This domain was associated with the Bitcoin wallet:

• 1FVx**********************DX

Blockchain review revealed a substantially different profile compared to previously identified addresses. This wallet recorded 175 incoming transactions and 175 outgoing transactions, with a total of 0.441 BTC received and 0.441 BTC sent. Activity began on 2018-11-08 and continued intermittently through 2025-01-14. At the time of analysis, the wallet held no remaining balance.

Unlike the single-transaction wallet identified earlier, this address reflected sustained operational use across multiple years. Funds were consistently transferred out after being received, indicating active circulation rather than accumulation.

In parallel, the wallet:

• bc1********************************3z8

originally identified on the mirror,5od5cgx6butoeasjpgyk753uwy6av3jlmfofrehemkdmhqnegtnqzbid.onion,was later found listed on another onion service:

• sfrlc*************************************azid.onion

This site presented itself as an “Onion BTC Wallet Database” and advertised the address for sale at 0.00804 BTC, displaying an alleged balance of 0.08044 BTC. However, blockchain inspection showed no transaction history for this wallet, creating a discrepancy between the advertised balance and observable activity.

This crossover introduced a different dimension to the investigation. Beyond operating through mirrors and rotating wallets, at least one Snuff Cinema–associated address appeared within a separate onion-based wallet marketplace, suggesting either data reuse, misrepresentation, or overlap between dark web services.

Additionally, the domain vxgilcmvjhsgehrh.onion was identified in four separate leaked documents indexed within StealthMole’s database. While the documents varied in context, the repeated appearance of the same onion address indicated that the platform had circulated beyond its own infrastructure, entering archived or leaked material ecosystems.

At this stage, Snuff Cinema’s footprint extended across three layers:

• Active and dormant Bitcoin wallets
• Mirror-based Tor deployment
• Cross-appearance within unrelated onion services and leaked documents

What began as a single-domain review had evolved into a multi-layer infrastructure profile with both financial and ecosystem exposure.

Cross-Platform Promotion and Domain Patterning

As the mirror network expanded, the investigation shifted toward determining whether Snuff Cinema operated exclusively within Tor or relied on external channels for visibility. A keyword search for “Snuff Cinema” within StealthMole’s indexed sources surfaced a Telegram reference dated 2024-03-04.

The post, titled “SNUFF CINEMA,” promoted an onion link:

• 5od5cgx25asuqylwbhempmjfmtggdzvpkcdw2qu25cmyps325v77nsyd.onion

The message included promotional language describing violent “snuff” content and directed readers toward the Tor domain. While the Telegram post itself did not provide operational details, it demonstrated that the platform’s onion addresses were being circulated beyond Tor.

What made this finding more significant was the structural similarity between the promoted domain and an already identified mirror:

• 5od5cgx25pfwv4fgqb6yjpxw6n6l3g7cxvh3metkbozoc3y3rjju2sqd.onion

Both addresses share the identical prefix:

• 5od5cgx25

This consistency suggests intentional naming continuity. While prefix similarity alone does not confirm cryptographic linkage, it indicates deliberate domain generation rather than coincidence. In practice, such structured prefixes are often associated with coordinated mirror management or vanity-generated onion addresses.

At this stage, Snuff Cinema appeared not only as a distributed onion service but as a platform leveraging multiple domains and external channels to sustain visibility and access.

Conclusion

The investigation into Snuff Cinema evolved from a routine domain review into a structured infrastructure analysis. What initially appeared to be a single Tor-hosted platform revealed a broader deployment strategy built on multiple mirror domains, segmented payment gateways, and diversified Bitcoin wallet usage.

Across the identified onion addresses, the platform did not rely on a centralized wallet or a single static domain. Instead, individual mirrors operated with distinct Bitcoin addresses, varying payment amounts, and differing levels of transaction activity. Some wallets remained dormant, others processed limited short-term payments, and at least one reflected sustained multi-year transactional movement. This layered financial structure suggests operational compartmentalization rather than a simplistic setup.

The appearance of one wallet within a separate onion-based wallet marketplace, along with domain references found in leaked documents, further expanded the platform’s digital footprint beyond its own mirror network. Additionally, the Telegram post promoting a structurally similar onion address demonstrated that access points were being circulated outside Tor, reinforcing visibility through external channels.

Taken together, these findings depict Snuff Cinema not as an isolated dark web page, but as a distributed service maintaining continuity through mirror proliferation, wallet diversification, and cross-platform exposure. The platform’s resilience appears to stem from fragmentation: domains, wallets, and access points functioning independently yet aligned under consistent branding.

Editorial Note

Dark web investigations rarely produce absolute attribution or linear operational clarity. Onion services shift, wallets rotate, and infrastructure evolves over time. What appears inactive today may resurface under a new domain tomorrow. This case illustrates how fragmented indicators can be systematically connected through StealthMole.

To access the unmasked report or full details, please reach out to us separately.

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