Selling Success: Inside the Telegram Network Behind Alleged NEET Paper Leaks

The National Eligibility cum Entrance Test (NEET) is India's largest medical entrance examination and serves as the primary gateway for admission to undergraduate medical and dental programs across the country. Every year, millions of students compete for a limited number of seats, making the examination one of the most competitive and closely watched in India.

That immense demand has also made NEET a recurring target for fraud. In the weeks leading up to the examination, social media platforms and messaging applications are frequently flooded with claims of leaked question papers, guaranteed answer keys, and offers promising access to the exam before test day. While many of these claims ultimately prove to be scams, allegations of genuine paper leaks have surfaced repeatedly over the years, blurring the line between opportunistic fraud and potentially organized criminal activity.

Against this backdrop, StealthMole identified a Telegram-based network actively promoting alleged NEET paper leaks ahead of the examination. What initially appeared to be a single advertisement soon developed into a broader investigation, revealing interconnected channels, recurring promotional tactics, and historical digital footprints that persisted even after some accounts had been removed from the platform.

This report examines that ecosystem, tracing the actors, infrastructure, and promotional strategies used to market alleged leaked examination papers while demonstrating how historical Telegram intelligence can help reconstruct online activity that might otherwise have disappeared.

Selling the Dream

The investigation was prompted by renewed public attention surrounding the NEET paper leak controversy in India. As allegations and media reports once again brought examination security into the spotlight, the objective was straightforward: to determine whether these discussions had left a measurable footprint within Telegram's underground communities and whether any actors were actively attempting to exploit the situation.

Using StealthMole's Telegram Tracker, initial searches for keywords such as "NEET" and "Exam" returned thousands of messages. Most consisted of news coverage, public discussions, and students debating the controversy. Buried among them, however, were a series of advertisements claiming to offer access to the NEET question paper before the examination. Rather than appearing as isolated posts, these messages surfaced repeatedly across different Telegram communities, each directing prospective buyers towards dedicated contact points or channels.

As the advertisements were reviewed more closely, recurring patterns began to emerge. Different accounts used remarkably similar language, promising "100% paper matches," advertising limited booking slots, and encouraging students to move into private conversations to complete transactions. Although none of these claims could be independently verified, the consistency of the messaging suggested a coordinated promotional effort rather than spontaneous opportunistic posts.

What began as a simple attempt to gauge the underground reaction to a high-profile national controversy quickly evolved into a broader investigation. Each new contact, channel, and advertisement opened another path to follow, gradually revealing that the alleged sale of leaked examination papers was part of a much larger Telegram ecosystem than initially expected.

Following the Advertisements

The initial advertisements uncovered through StealthMole's Telegram Tracker quickly demonstrated that the campaign extended beyond simple claims of leaked examination papers. Although different accounts were responsible for posting the messages, the advertisements followed a remarkably consistent pattern, suggesting that similar marketing tactics were being reused across multiple Telegram communities.

One of the earliest advertisements was identified in the Telegram channel PEER 2 PEER EXCHANGE, where a user publicly invited anyone interested in obtaining the NEET examination paper to contact a dedicated Telegram account.

• Telegram Channel: https://t.me/E*******p
• Message: "KISIKO NEET EXAM KA QUESTION PAPER CHAIYE TOH DM KARO"
• Translation: Who wants NEET Exam question paper, DM me
• Contact Identifier: @Neet********7

Rather than relying on a single promotional message, the campaign continued with increasingly aggressive claims. In subsequent posts, the same campaign publicly challenged India's National Testing Agency (NTA), dismissing official assurances that the RE-NEET examination paper would remain secure. One message openly declared that the authorities would be unable to prevent another leak before ending with an "Open Challenge" directed at the NTA.

The campaign did not stop at challenging the authorities. Additional advertisements introduced familiar scarcity tactics intended to create urgency among prospective buyers. Messages repeatedly claimed that bookings had opened, that only a limited number of students would receive the paper, and that interested candidates should secure their place before registrations closed. Several posts also promised that the examination paper would be delivered shortly before the exam while advertising a "100% Paper Match" guarantee.

Across different Telegram groups, the wording changed slightly, but the underlying message remained consistent. Prospective buyers were encouraged to move away from public discussions and contact specific Telegram accounts directly, suggesting that negotiations and transactions were intended to take place privately rather than within the public groups where the advertisements were originally posted.

As additional identifiers were investigated, the campaign continued to expand into other Telegram communities, revealing that the advertisements were being circulated by multiple accounts rather than remaining confined to a single group or operator. This marked the first indication that the investigation was dealing with a broader promotional network rather than isolated attempts to exploit public interest surrounding the NEET controversy.

Raghav: A Campaign Across Communities

One of the earliest actors to emerge from the investigation operated under the display name "RAGHAV SIR." Raghav did not rely on a dedicated Telegram channel to promote alleged examination papers. Instead, the campaign was distributed across multiple Telegram communities, allowing the advertisements to reach audiences already engaged in underground trading and illicit services.

StealthMole identified two separate Telegram user IDs using the RAGHAV SIR branding. While both accounts shared similar naming conventions and promoted alleged RE-NEET examination papers using comparable messaging, the available evidence is insufficient to conclude whether they belonged to the same individual or represented multiple operators using a common identity. For this reason, they are treated as related identities operating under the same promotional persona.

Observed Telegram User IDs

• RAGHAV SIR: 8628584329
• RAGHAV SIR NEET: 8494718439

Raghav's activity was spread across existing Telegram communities, including PEER 2 PEER EXCHANGE and MJ Trusted Market. This approach significantly increased the visibility of the advertisements by placing them alongside other underground services rather than restricting them to a single audience.

The investigation also showed that alleged NEET paper leaks represented only one aspect of the account's activity. Messages attributed to the RAGHAV SIR branding advertised a variety of unrelated products and services, including gift cards, iPhone unlock codes, and financial offers. This broader activity suggests that the operator was already active within Telegram's underground trading ecosystem and incorporated examination-related fraud into an existing portfolio of illicit advertisements rather than creating a campaign dedicated solely to NEET.

This distinction is important. Instead of investing in dedicated infrastructure, Raghav appeared to rely on visibility within established underground communities, adapting promotional content according to demand. The approach required little infrastructure while providing access to audiences already familiar with illicit transactions, making Telegram groups an effective distribution channel for alleged examination paper advertisements.

Although Raghav's campaign demonstrated how existing underground communities could be leveraged to promote alleged paper leaks, another investigative pivot uncovered a markedly different approach. Rather than operating across multiple communities, a second actor had established a dedicated Telegram channel devoted almost entirely to marketing alleged NEET examination papers, signalling a more structured and persistent operation.

Abhishek: Building a Dedicated Marketplace

While Raghav's campaign relied on visibility across established Telegram communities, another investigative pivot revealed a more structured operation centred around a dedicated Telegram channel. Instead of promoting alleged examination papers within unrelated groups, the operator concentrated promotional activity within a single space, creating an environment focused almost entirely on attracting prospective NEET candidates.

The investigation identified the Telegram account @abhimishra0345, which repeatedly directed users towards a dedicated Telegram channel named "Neet Paper Leaked 🚀." Unlike the distributed promotional strategy observed earlier, this channel functioned as a central hub where advertisements, updates, and recruitment messages were published on a regular basis.

Telegram Account

• @abhimishra0345

Telegram Channel

• https://t.me/r***************d

Channel Name

• NEET Paper Leaked

Analysis of the channel showed that it was maintained as more than a simple advertisement board. Posts were published over an extended period, gradually building anticipation ahead of the examination. Rather than repeatedly sharing identical messages, the operator maintained an active campaign by announcing booking periods, reminding students of approaching deadlines, publishing updates for prospective buyers, and regularly encouraging users to contact the account directly.

One notable characteristic of the operation was its attempt to portray itself as an organised service rather than an anonymous seller. Alongside promotional posts advertising alleged examination papers, the operator published announcements relating to admissions, frequently responded to concerns about scams, and attempted to distinguish the channel from competing actors targeting NEET candidates. This consistent branding created the appearance of an established operation rather than a short-lived promotional campaign.

The investigation also revealed that the channel's activity remained highly focused on examination-related fraud. Unlike Raghav, whose advertisements appeared alongside a variety of unrelated underground services, Abhishek's operation revolved almost exclusively around NEET, allowing the channel to cultivate a dedicated audience interested in examination papers rather than general illicit trading.

This shift from distributed advertisements to a dedicated promotional channel marked an important evolution in the investigation. It suggested that while some actors leveraged existing underground marketplaces to reach potential buyers, others invested in maintaining their own infrastructure, giving them greater control over branding, messaging, and long-term engagement with prospective customers.

Manufacturing Credibility

Simply advertising alleged examination papers was not enough to convince prospective buyers. As the investigation progressed, it became evident that operators invested considerable effort in presenting themselves as credible and trustworthy, employing a range of psychological techniques designed to reduce hesitation and encourage students to engage privately.

One of the clearest examples was observed within the Neet Paper Leaked channel, where promotional messages were supplemented with screenshots presented as conversations with previous buyers. These posts portrayed individuals thanking the operator, claiming that the supplied papers matched the examination, and expressing satisfaction with the outcome.

Although the authenticity of these conversations could not be independently verified, they served an important purpose within the campaign. Rather than asking prospective buyers to rely solely on promotional claims, the operator attempted to create the appearance of a proven track record by showcasing what appeared to be successful transactions and satisfied customers.

Credibility was reinforced further through carefully staged promotional messages addressing common concerns raised by prospective buyers. Posts repeatedly assured students that the examination paper would be delivered before the exam, explained booking procedures, responded to questions regarding payment, and attempted to distinguish the channel from competing actors by warning users about scammers operating on Telegram.

The warnings about competing scammers were particularly noteworthy. Rather than discouraging participation altogether, the operator encouraged students to avoid "fake" sellers while portraying the channel as a reliable alternative. This approach positioned the operator as a trusted intermediary within an already crowded marketplace, allowing concerns about fraud to become part of the marketing strategy itself.

Another recurring tactic involved presenting the operation as an organised service rather than an anonymous transaction. References to booking windows, structured payment processes, and ongoing updates created the impression of an established operation with repeat customers and defined procedures. Whether genuine or fabricated, these elements worked together to reinforce the perception that prospective buyers were dealing with a long-standing service rather than a newly created Telegram account.

These findings suggest that the campaign relied on far more than bold claims about leaked examination papers. It systematically combined urgency, exclusivity, social proof, and anti-scam messaging to build credibility before attempting to convert interested students into paying customers.

What Historical Indexing Revealed

As the investigation progressed, attention shifted from the promotional campaign itself to the digital footprints left behind by its operators. One of the most valuable findings emerged when the Telegram account associated with the Neet Paper Leaked channel was revisited. By the time of the investigation, the account had already been deleted from Telegram, eliminating the profile that prospective buyers would have originally interacted with.

Ordinarily, the removal of an account would also erase much of the contextual information surrounding its activity. However, StealthMole's historical Telegram indexing preserved earlier snapshots of the profile, allowing the investigation to reconstruct details that were no longer publicly accessible.

Current Account Status

• Telegram Account: @abhimishra0345
• Current Status: Deleted

Historical Profile Information

• First Name: Abhishek
• Telegram ID: 5448350989

Historical Biography

• https://t.me/r*********************d

The historical profile data established a direct connection between the deleted account and the promotional channel previously identified during the investigation. While the live Telegram profile had disappeared, its earlier biography still contained a reference to the Neet Paper Leaked channel, strengthening the attribution between the operator and the campaign.

Historical indexing also preserved messages that were no longer easily discoverable through Telegram itself. These records showed that the account had actively promoted alleged examination papers across multiple Telegram communities, announced booking periods, published campaign updates, and encouraged prospective buyers to join the dedicated channel throughout the promotional period.

Rather than representing isolated remnants of deleted content, these historical artifacts enabled the investigation to reconstruct the evolution of the campaign after its public infrastructure had begun to disappear. This proved particularly valuable because it demonstrated that the removal of a Telegram account does not necessarily eliminate the surrounding intelligence. Historical records can continue to reveal relationships between accounts, channels, and promotional activity long after individual profiles have been removed from public view.

In this case, historical Telegram intelligence did more than recover deleted information. It helped preserve the operational context of the campaign, connecting a deleted operator profile to an active promotional channel and providing a more complete picture of how the alleged examination paper advertisements were organized and maintained over time.

Conclusion

What began as a simple search to determine whether the latest NEET paper leak controversy had generated activity within Telegram quickly developed into a much broader investigation. Rather than uncovering isolated advertisements, the investigation revealed a network of Telegram communities where alleged examination papers were repeatedly promoted using recurring marketing strategies, multiple operator identities, and carefully constructed credibility-building techniques.

The investigation identified two distinct operational approaches. One actor relied on established underground communities to distribute promotional messages across multiple groups, while another maintained a dedicated Telegram channel focused almost exclusively on attracting prospective NEET candidates. Although no evidence was found to confirm that genuine examination papers were ever obtained or distributed, the investigation documented a structured campaign that systematically exploited examination anxiety through urgency, scarcity, and social proof.

These findings demonstrate that Telegram continues to provide fertile ground for actors seeking to profit from high-profile examination controversies. More importantly, they illustrate how historical intelligence, behavioral analysis, and careful correlation of digital artifacts can transform scattered advertisements into a coherent picture of the infrastructure and tactics supporting such campaigns.

Editorial Note

Investigations involving online fraud and underground communities rarely produce complete or definitive attribution. Identities change, accounts disappear, and campaigns evolve rapidly. This case demonstrates how StealthMole's historical intelligence and artifact correlation capabilities enable analysts to reconstruct activity, uncover meaningful connections, and investigate evolving campaigns with greater confidence.

To access the unmasked report or full details, please reach out to us separately.

Contact us: support@stealthmole.com

Following the Trail of Anubis: Forums, Onion Sites, and the Rise of a Ransomware Operation

Some ransomware operations appear suddenly. A new name surfaces, victims begin to appear, and attention quickly shifts to the impact of the attacks. What often goes unnoticed is everything that happens before that point.

Behind every ransomware operation is a period of growth. Infrastructure is built, relationships are formed, and an online presence gradually takes shape across corners of the internet that most people never see. Traces of that activity are often scattered across forums, hidden services, and other platforms, leaving behind a digital trail that can reveal how an operation evolved long before it gained wider attention.

This investigation follows that trail.

Using StealthMole, a series of seemingly unrelated discoveries led to a deeper examination of Anubis, a ransomware operation that has steadily expanded its presence across the underground ecosystem. What began as a routine inquiry soon developed into a broader effort to understand how the operation established itself, promoted its services, and grew its network over time.

The sections that follow reconstruct that journey, tracing the digital footprint left behind by Anubis and the individuals operating under its banner.

Following the First Lead

The investigation began after Anubis published a ransomware listing targeting a South Korean company operating in the semiconductor and industrial equipment sector. The victim entry was identified through StealthMole's Ransomware Monitoring module and directed visitors to a dedicated page hosted on the group's leak platform:

• om6q4a*********************************u4aqd.onion/

At first glance, the listing appeared similar to many ransomware leak posts regularly published across the dark web. However, rather than focusing solely on the victim, the investigation turned toward the operation responsible for publishing the claim.

A broader search for Anubis within StealthMole's Ransomware Monitoring module revealed that the group had publicly listed 83 victims between February 2025 and June 2026, suggesting that the latest attack was part of a much larger operation. Additional searches across StealthMole's monitoring datasets uncovered references to the same leak infrastructure in connection with other organizations, including a US county, further indicating that the operation had maintained an active presence for an extended period.

While the victim listings provided a starting point, they offered only a limited view of the operation itself. To better understand who was behind Anubis and how the group had established its presence, the investigation shifted beyond the leak site and began tracing the digital footprint surrounding the operation. That search soon led to a recurring identity that appeared across multiple underground platforms.

The Emergence of Anubis Media

As the investigation moved beyond victim listings and into the wider footprint surrounding Anubis, one name began appearing repeatedly across multiple platforms: Anubis Media.

The earliest discovery was an account on the XSS forum, registered on 16 November 2024 under the profile:

• https://xss.***/members/4*****8/

The account's profile description translated to "We convey information," a message that would later align closely with the branding and public image promoted by the Anubis operation. At the time, however, there was little to suggest how significant this persona would become.

Further investigation uncovered the same identity across multiple underground communities, including:

• https://breachforums.**/User-Anubis-media
• https://breachforums.**/User-Anubis-media
• https://breachforums.**/User-Anubis-media

Rather than appearing as isolated registrations, these accounts demonstrated a consistent effort to establish a recognizable presence across several well-known cybercriminal forums.

The same branding also appeared outside traditional forum environments. An X account operating under the handle Anubis*****a was identified at:

• https://x.com/Anubis******a

The account was used to publish updates related to the operation, share infrastructure announcements, and promote content associated with the Anubis brand.

It remained unclear whether Anubis Media represented a single operator, a spokesperson, or a broader public-facing identity used by the group. What was clear, however, was that the name appeared consistently across multiple platforms and increasingly served as a common thread connecting disparate pieces of the investigation.

As additional findings emerged, Anubis Media would become closely associated with the promotion of services, recruitment efforts, and infrastructure linked to the Anubis operation.

Building a Presence Across the Underground

The growing presence of Anubis Media across multiple platforms was accompanied by a steady stream of advertisements promoting various services associated with the operation. These posts provided a clearer view of how the group was attempting to establish itself within the underground ecosystem and attract potential partners.

One of the earliest examples was identified on ReHub:

• https://rehubcom.***/threads/*****/

The post advertised a corporate access monetization program built around a profit-sharing model. Similar advertisements were later discovered on several BreachForums instances as well as mirrored versions.

• https://breachforums.**/Thread********monetization-50-50-Earn

The advertisements sought individuals with access to corporate environments and invited them to collaborate with the operation under a 50/50 revenue-sharing arrangement. According to the posts, preferred targets included organizations located in the United States, Canada, Europe, and Australia. The advertisements specifically referenced access types such as VPNs, RDWeb deployments, Citrix environments, remote code execution opportunities, and other forms of corporate network access.

The same activity was not limited to a single forum. Similar recruitment efforts were identified on XSS, where the Anubis Media persona promoted access monetization services to another underground audience. The repeated appearance of these advertisements across multiple communities suggested a deliberate effort to expand the operation's network of partners rather than relying solely on internally obtained access.

At this stage, the investigation revealed an operation focused not only on public visibility but also on building relationships within the cybercriminal ecosystem. The recurring recruitment campaigns indicated that Anubis was actively seeking opportunities to acquire access, attract collaborators, and increase its operational reach.

While these advertisements demonstrated how the operation sought to expand, they also raised another question. What services were those partners ultimately being recruited to support? The answer emerged through a separate set of posts that revealed the group's ransomware ambitions.

From Leak Operation to Ransomware Program

The purpose behind Anubis' recruitment efforts became clearer following the discovery of a dedicated thread on the RAMP forum:

• https://ramp4u.**/threads/data-ransom-ransomware-anubis*****

Created by the user superSonic on 23 February 2025, the post provided one of the earliest detailed descriptions of the services being offered under the Anubis brand. Notably, the timing closely aligned with the emergence of the group's leak infrastructure, suggesting that the operation's public-facing presence and recruitment efforts developed in parallel.

Rather than advertising a single service, the RAMP post presented Anubis as a multi-faceted operation built around two primary offerings: ransomware and data extortion.

The ransomware component promoted support for Windows, Linux, NAS, and ESXi environments while highlighting features designed to maximize operational impact. The advertisement described capabilities such as network-wide deployment, privilege escalation, shadow copy removal, and disruption of virtualized environments. The post also referenced multiple encryption modes, including a "Lite Locker" option and a destructive wipe mode.

Alongside the ransomware offering, the thread introduced a separate "Data Ransom" model. Unlike traditional ransomware campaigns that rely on encryption, this service focused on monetizing stolen corporate information. Individuals in possession of sensitive company data were invited to collaborate with the operation, allowing Anubis to leverage its existing infrastructure and publicity channels to pressure victims and generate revenue from leaked information.

This distinction proved particularly significant. The model suggested that Anubis was not solely dependent on ransomware deployments to generate income. Instead, the operation appeared willing to profit from both network intrusions and independently acquired datasets, broadening the range of opportunities available to potential partners.

The RAMP advertisement also outlined preferred target regions, including the United States, Canada, Europe, and Australia. At the same time, the post stated that organizations associated with government, education, non-profit sectors, BRICS countries, and former Soviet states were excluded from the group's stated targeting criteria.

By this stage of the investigation, Anubis no longer appeared to be simply a ransomware leak site or a collection of forum profiles. The evidence pointed toward an operation actively recruiting affiliates, acquiring access opportunities, and promoting multiple revenue streams under a single brand.

As the investigation continued, attention shifted from the services being advertised to the infrastructure supporting them.

Mapping the Anubis Infrastructure

The investigation's next phase focused on the infrastructure supporting the Anubis operation. Using StealthMole's Dark Web Tracker, multiple pages associated with the group's leak platform were identified, including dedicated sections for news, rules, frequently asked questions, and operational information.

At the center of this infrastructure was the group's primary leak site:

• om6q4a6*************************************4aqd.onion

The site served as the public-facing hub for the operation, hosting victim listings, announcements, and guidance for both affected organizations and prospective collaborators. Several of the pages contained contact information and references that helped connect the infrastructure to identities previously identified during the investigation.

One of the most significant findings appeared within the Rules section, where the operation publicly provided multiple communication channels:

• qTox ID: 354217********************************************948F
• Email: anu*****t@onionmail.org
• PGP Fingerprint: D59C**********************5A1

The same page also directed visitors to several forum profiles previously encountered during the investigation, including the RAMP account associated with superSonic and the Anubis Media presence on underground forums. These references provided an important bridge between the operation's infrastructure and its public recruitment activities.

Further examination of the platform revealed that Anubis had invested in maintaining a structured and regularly updated environment rather than a simple victim listing page. Sections dedicated to operational announcements, leak publications, and user guidance suggested an effort to create a recognizable and persistent presence within the underground ecosystem.

Additional infrastructure surfaced through the group's X account, which announced a new onion domain on 12 June 2025:

• anubis*************************************y6ad.onion

The domain was described as a "New Node DLS." While the service appeared inactive or under maintenance at the time of investigation, the announcement provided evidence that the operation was actively expanding or maintaining additional infrastructure beyond its primary leak platform.

These findings revealed an operation that had developed far beyond a single leak site. The infrastructure connected communication channels, forum identities, victim publications, and operational announcements into a unified ecosystem supporting the broader Anubis brand.

Public Messaging and Brand Development

While the technical infrastructure provided insight into how Anubis operated, the content published across its platforms offered a different perspective into how the group wanted to be perceived.

Throughout the investigation, the Anubis operation consistently avoided presenting itself solely as a ransomware group. Instead, references across its leak platform, forum accounts, and social media presence repeatedly emphasized themes more commonly associated with information publishing and disclosure.

This approach was particularly visible through the Anubis Media identity, which appeared across multiple underground platforms and served as the public-facing voice of the operation. The account maintained a presence on X, BreachForums, XSS, and other communities, regularly promoting updates, services, and infrastructure associated with the Anubis brand.

The operation's About page reinforced this image by describing Anubis as a media-focused platform dedicated to publishing information. Similar messaging appeared elsewhere throughout the ecosystem, including the XSS profile description associated with Anubis Media, which stated: "We convey information."

The same narrative extended to the FAQ section of the leak platform. In addition to addressing victim inquiries, the page openly invited communication from individuals possessing unpublished corporate information and offered collaboration opportunities involving exclusive data. Separate sections also encouraged engagement from journalists and media representatives interested in discussing leaked information.

These findings suggest that Anubis was deliberately cultivating an identity that extended beyond traditional ransomware activity. Rather than presenting itself exclusively as an extortion operation, the group consistently incorporated media-oriented language into its public communications, recruitment efforts, and platform design.

Whether this branding strategy was intended to attract partners, increase visibility, or distinguish the operation from competing groups remains unclear. However, the consistency of the messaging across multiple platforms indicates that it formed a deliberate part of the Anubis identity rather than an isolated marketing effort.

Conclusion

What began with a single victim listing ultimately revealed a much broader operation. By following the trail left across ransomware monitoring data, underground forums, social media accounts, and onion services, the investigation uncovered an ecosystem that extended well beyond a conventional leak site.

The findings show that Anubis invested considerable effort into establishing its presence across the underground landscape. Recruitment campaigns, access monetization programs, dedicated infrastructure, and the recurring appearance of the Anubis Media persona all point to an operation focused not only on conducting attacks but also on expanding its reach and visibility within cybercriminal communities.

While many ransomware groups become visible only after victims begin appearing on their leak sites, the Anubis case demonstrates the value of examining the activity that occurs behind the scenes. Long before an operation gains wider attention, traces of its development can often be found across the platforms, services, and communities that support its growth. By connecting those traces, it becomes possible to build a more complete understanding of how an operation evolves and positions itself within the broader ransomware ecosystem.

Editorial Note

Cybercriminal operations rarely emerge fully formed. Long before victims appear on leak sites or attacks attract public attention, traces of an operation's growth can often be found across forums, hidden services, recruitment posts, and other pieces of digital infrastructure.

While the findings presented in this report are based on artifacts identified during the investigation, attribution in cybercrime investigations is rarely absolute, and online identities can be shared, abandoned, or deliberately misleading. This case highlights how StealthMole can help investigators navigate that uncertainty by connecting information across multiple sources, enabling a clearer view of how an operation develops and establishes itself within the underground ecosystem.

To access the unmasked report or full details, please reach out to us separately.

Contact us: support@stealthmole.com

From ChatGPT to CheatGPT: What Lies Behind a Dark Web Hacker Chatbot

Over the past few years, artificial intelligence has gone from a niche technology to something most people interact with almost daily. Whether it is asking ChatGPT for help with a task, generating content, or solving a technical problem, AI chatbots have become part of everyday life for millions of users around the world.

As the technology gained popularity, it was only a matter of time before underground communities began adapting the concept for their own purposes. A growing number of dark web services now market themselves as unrestricted alternatives to mainstream AI platforms, promising everything from malware development and phishing assistance to other activities that legitimate AI providers actively prohibit.

One such service is CheatGPT, a dark web platform that presents itself as an AI-powered hacking assistant. At first glance, the website appears to be another attempt to capitalize on the popularity of AI by offering an underground alternative to mainstream chatbot services. However, a closer look reveals a far more interesting story.

What began as a routine investigation into a dark web AI service gradually expanded into a broader examination of the infrastructure, payment systems, and contact mechanisms supporting the platform. Along the way, multiple connections emerged that suggested CheatGPT may not exist in isolation. Instead, it appeared to be part of a much larger ecosystem operating across the dark web.

This report follows the trail beyond CheatGPT itself to explore what lies behind the service and the network of platforms connected to it.

The Discovery of CheatGPT

The investigation that ultimately led to CheatGPT did not begin with artificial intelligence at all.

At the time, we were investigating KidBin, a dark web platform associated with child sexual abuse material (CSAM). As part of that investigation, several cryptocurrency payment mechanisms used by the platform were identified and examined to better understand how the service operated and whether it shared infrastructure with other websites.

One of those payment artifacts became particularly interesting.

When the Bitcoin wallet was pivoted through StealthMole's Dark Web Tracker, the results extended well beyond KidBin itself. The same wallet appeared across multiple dark web services, some of which belonged to entirely different categories of illicit activity. What initially looked like a routine infrastructure check quickly became something much larger.

Among the results was a service called CheatGPT.

Unlike the websites that had led to its discovery, CheatGPT was not a file-sharing platform or a content repository. Instead, it presented itself as an AI-powered assistant designed specifically for cybercriminals. The service openly promoted capabilities related to hacking, malware development, phishing, account compromise, and other activities commonly restricted by mainstream AI providers.

At first glance, CheatGPT appeared to be another entrant in the growing underground market for AI-powered hacking tools. The platform offered subscription plans, accepted cryptocurrency payments, and marketed itself as an unrestricted alternative to legitimate chatbot services.

However, the circumstances surrounding its discovery raised an obvious question.

Why would a dark web AI chatbot share payment infrastructure with completely different services discovered during a separate investigation?

Answering that question became the focus of the investigation. What followed was a series of pivots through wallets, contact identifiers, and infrastructure artifacts that gradually revealed a far more complex picture than the website's front page suggested.

Inside CheatGPT

After identifying CheatGPT during the KidBin investigation, the next step was to understand exactly what the platform was offering and how it presented itself to potential users.

Unlike traditional dark web forums or marketplaces, CheatGPT was designed to resemble a modern AI chatbot platform. The website featured a polished interface, user registration functionality, subscription plans, and a conversational chat environment intended to mimic the experience offered by mainstream AI services.

• Cheatgpt****************************************6blid.onion

According to its marketing material, CheatGPT was built as an unrestricted alternative to popular AI assistants. The platform openly advertised its ability to assist with activities that legitimate providers actively prohibit, including malware development, phishing campaigns, social engineering, credential theft, vulnerability exploitation, and other offensive cyber operations.

Throughout the website, the operators positioned CheatGPT as a tool for users seeking answers without the content restrictions commonly encountered on mainstream AI platforms. Promotional material emphasized privacy, anonymous cryptocurrency payments, and the absence of logging, all themes commonly used to appeal to dark web audiences.

The platform offered three subscription tiers:

Plan	Price	Features
Starter Access	$20	Standard access
Monthly Pro Mode	$40	API access, higher usage limits, priority processing
Elite Lifetime Access	$100	API access, higher usage limits, priority processing, and exclusive functionality

Several sections of the website attempted to demonstrate the platform's capabilities through screenshots and example conversations. These examples focused heavily on cybercrime-related scenarios, including malware generation, phishing, credential theft, and other offensive use cases. The site's FAQ section reinforced this positioning by explicitly discussing topics such as hacking, website attacks, account compromise, and malware development.

The platform also claimed compatibility with open-source AI models and referenced technologies such as GGUF and LLaMA. Additionally, the operators stated that the service was available not only through its onion presence but also through a subscriber-accessible clearnet environment, although no associated clearnet domain was identified during this investigation.

On the surface, CheatGPT appeared to be exactly what it claimed to be: a dark web AI assistant designed for cybercriminals. However, as the investigation moved beyond the platform's marketing material and into the infrastructure supporting it, a different picture began to emerge.

Following the Money

To better understand whether CheatGPT was operating independently or as part of a larger network, the investigation shifted away from the website itself and toward its payment infrastructure.

Several cryptocurrency wallets were identified on the platform, including Bitcoin, Ethereum, and Monero addresses used for subscription payments. Rather than focusing on the service's marketing claims, these payment artifacts were used as pivot points across StealthMole's Dark Web Tracker to determine where else they appeared.

The first significant finding emerged from the Bitcoin wallet:

• bc1q****************************3tq

This wallet had already attracted attention during the earlier KidBin investigation. When examined in greater detail, it became clear that its presence was not limited to either KidBin or CheatGPT. The same wallet was identified as a payment address across multiple dark web services, including:

• CheatGPT
• KidBin
• LoliPorn
• Additional LoliPorn-related infrastructure

Importantly, the wallet was not merely mentioned within indexed content. In each case, it appeared directly within payment workflows and was presented to users as a destination for cryptocurrency transactions.

The overlap immediately raised questions. CheatGPT marketed itself as an AI-powered hacking assistant, while the other platforms belonged to an entirely different category of dark web services. At face value, there was little reason to expect them to share payment infrastructure.

Further analysis of additional CheatGPT-associated Bitcoin wallets revealed a similar pattern.

A second wallet was identified on a WormGPT payment page. The same wallet also appeared within LoliPorn-related infrastructure, creating another connection between services that initially appeared unrelated.

• bc1q****************************xp5h

A third wallet extended the pattern even further. In addition to appearing on LoliPorn infrastructure, the wallet was also linked to a platform known as Torture Rooms.

• bc1q********************************r647

By this stage of the investigation, a recurring trend had become difficult to ignore. Different services, operating under different names and serving different audiences, repeatedly converged on the same pool of payment infrastructure.

What initially appeared to be a single AI-powered hacking service was beginning to look like one part of a much larger ecosystem.

As additional wallets were examined, the overlaps continued to grow. The investigation soon expanded beyond Bitcoin and into a broader collection of cryptocurrency addresses, introducing new connections that would further complicate the picture.

Different Names, Familiar Infrastructure

By this stage of the investigation, the repeated cryptocurrency overlaps suggested that CheatGPT was unlikely to be operating in complete isolation. To better understand the scope of those connections, all cryptocurrency payment mechanisms identified on the platform were collected and examined.

The investigation identified the following cryptocurrency addresses associated with CheatGPT:

Bitcoin

• bc1q**********************************r647
• bc1q**********************************xp5h
• bc1q**********************************n3tq

Ethereum

• 0x3***********************************c62

Monero

• 89Tc8****************************************************uNiu
• 89AFz****************************************************bUqV

While the Bitcoin overlaps had already revealed connections to several other dark web services, the Ethereum and Monero infrastructure introduced an entirely new set of relationships.

The Ethereum wallet was identified on multiple platforms beyond CheatGPT. Among them were WormGPT, FraudGPT, and a service operating under the name Dark Web Porn Official. In each case, the same Ethereum address appeared as part of the platform's cryptocurrency payment infrastructure.

The overlaps did not stop there.

Further examination revealed that the Monero wallets associated with CheatGPT also appeared elsewhere within the ecosystem. One of the Monero addresses was shared with WormGPT, while another was linked to infrastructure associated with Dark Web Porn Official. These findings mirrored the patterns already observed through Bitcoin and Ethereum analysis, where seemingly separate services repeatedly converged on the same payment mechanisms.

The platforms themselves also shared notable similarities.

FraudGPT and WormGPT displayed nearly identical layouts, navigation structures, subscription models, and payment workflows. Their websites followed the same overall design philosophy, presenting themselves as AI-powered assistants intended for offensive cyber operations. While website templates can be copied or reused, the similarities became more noteworthy when viewed alongside the overlapping cryptocurrency infrastructure.

At this point, the investigation was no longer focused solely on CheatGPT.

Instead, a broader picture was beginning to emerge. Multiple services operating under different names appeared to share elements of their financial infrastructure while simultaneously presenting similar products to similar audiences. Whether these overlaps represented shared operators, shared developers, or a common service provider remained unclear. What was becoming increasingly difficult to dismiss, however, was the consistency with which these supposedly independent platforms continued to intersect.

The strongest connections, however, were not found in cryptocurrency wallets at all. They emerged through a set of recurring contact identifiers that appeared across multiple platforms and mirror domains.

The Contact Trail

While the cryptocurrency overlaps revealed an increasingly interconnected network of services, some of the most compelling findings emerged from a different set of artifacts entirely.

During the investigation, several contact identifiers were recovered from CheatGPT and associated infrastructure:

• Cheat******1@proton.me
• wo*****t@cock.**
• wo*****t@xmpp.**

At first glance, these appeared to be standard support or communication channels. However, further investigation revealed that the same identifiers were being reused across multiple platforms operating under different names.

The ProtonMail address Cheat*****1@proton.me was linked to several CheatGPT onion domains, including:

• cheatgpt*******************************************qmtqd.onion
• cheatgpt*******************************************tk7yd.onion
• cheatgpt*******************************************6blid.onion

This provided a clear link between multiple CheatGPT mirrors and helped establish them as part of the same service rather than unrelated websites using a similar name.

More interesting findings emerged from the identifiers wo****t@cock.** and wo***t@xmpp.**.

Rather than being limited to WormGPT infrastructure, these addresses appeared across multiple services examined during the investigation. The address wormgpt@cock.li was linked to:

• wormgpt**********************************************qqd.onion
• wormgpt**********************************************uad.onion
• wormgpt**********************************************7ad.onion
• fraudcd**********************************************yyd.onion
• cheatgpt*********************************************lid.onion

Similarly, wo****t@xmpp.** was identified across multiple WormGPT mirror domains and was also linked to CheatGPT infrastructure.

This pattern stood out because the services involved were marketed as separate products. CheatGPT, WormGPT, and FraudGPT each presented themselves as independent platforms with their own branding and identities. Yet behind the scenes, the same communication channels repeatedly appeared across their infrastructure.

The findings did not conclusively establish common ownership. However, they did demonstrate that the platforms were not as isolated from one another as their branding suggested. The repeated reuse of the same contact identifiers across multiple services provided another layer of overlap alongside the cryptocurrency infrastructure already identified during the investigation.

By this stage, several independent investigative paths had produced similar results. Wallet analysis, payment infrastructure, mirror domains, and communication channels all pointed toward a closely connected ecosystem operating behind multiple dark web services.

One final lead remained. During the investigation, an exposed server-status page revealed a potentially interesting infrastructure artifact. While it initially appeared promising, further analysis would produce a very different outcome.

Looking Beyond the Front-End

As the investigation progressed, attention shifted toward potential infrastructure artifacts that might provide additional insight into the services operating behind CheatGPT.

One such lead emerged from a server-status page associated with the platform:

• http://cheatgpt********************blid.onion/server-status

The page exposed the IP address:

• **7.**7.**3.**3

At first glance, the finding appeared noteworthy. Infrastructure-related artifacts can occasionally provide valuable clues regarding hosting arrangements, shared resources, or operational relationships between services. As a result, the IP address was examined further within StealthMole.

However, the follow-up investigation produced a different picture.

Searches revealed that the same IP address appeared across multiple unrelated server-status pages and was referenced within content that showed no obvious connection to CheatGPT, WormGPT, FraudGPT, or any of the other services identified during the investigation. Rather than functioning as a unique infrastructure indicator, the IP appeared to be associated with a broader collection of records that could not be reliably linked to any specific platform.

As a result, the artifact was treated with caution.

While the IP address was documented as part of the investigation, the available evidence was insufficient to establish it as a meaningful attribution indicator. Unlike the cryptocurrency wallets, contact identifiers, and mirror domains identified elsewhere in the investigation, the server-status finding did not provide a reliable basis for linking services or identifying operators.

The distinction is important.

Dark web investigations frequently generate large volumes of technical artifacts, but not every artifact carries the same evidentiary value. In this case, the IP address represented an interesting lead rather than a confirmed finding, and it was ultimately excluded from the broader attribution assessment.

Even without the server-status discovery, however, the investigation had already uncovered a substantial collection of overlapping infrastructure, payment mechanisms, and communication channels connecting multiple dark web services. Taken together, those findings painted a far more revealing picture than any single technical artifact could provide.

Conclusion

What began as a routine investigation into KidBin ultimately led far beyond its original scope.

The discovery of CheatGPT initially appeared to represent little more than another dark web service attempting to capitalize on the growing popularity of artificial intelligence. On the surface, the platform presented itself as a subscription-based chatbot designed to assist cybercriminals with activities ranging from phishing and malware development to other offensive cyber operations.

However, as the investigation progressed, the focus shifted away from the platform's marketing claims and toward the infrastructure supporting it.

Through a series of cryptocurrency pivots, multiple overlaps were identified between CheatGPT and a wider collection of dark web services. These connections extended across Bitcoin, Ethereum, and Monero payment mechanisms, linking CheatGPT to platforms operating under different names and serving different purposes. Further analysis revealed recurring contact identifiers, shared communication channels, and mirror infrastructure that appeared repeatedly throughout the investigation.

The findings did not conclusively establish that a single operator controlled every identified service. Attribution within dark web environments is rarely that straightforward. What the investigation did reveal, however, was a consistent pattern of shared infrastructure that challenged the appearance of independence presented by several of the platforms examined.

CheatGPT, WormGPT, and FraudGPT were found sharing more than a common theme. Cryptocurrency wallets, contact identifiers, communication channels, and supporting infrastructure repeatedly intersected across multiple services, suggesting the existence of a closely connected ecosystem operating behind a collection of seemingly separate brands.

Perhaps the most notable aspect of the investigation was not the discovery of a dark web AI chatbot itself, but what emerged when the surrounding infrastructure was examined. A service that initially appeared to be a standalone platform became the entry point into a much broader network of interconnected services, demonstrating how seemingly unrelated investigations can converge when viewed through the lens of shared operational artifacts.

In the end, the investigation serves as a reminder that the most valuable intelligence findings are often uncovered not on a website's front page, but within the infrastructure quietly supporting it.

Editorial Note

Dark web investigations rarely follow a straight path. What begins as the analysis of a single platform can quickly expand into a much broader examination of interconnected services, shared infrastructure, and overlapping operational footprints. While definitive attribution often remains difficult, the ability to identify and follow these connections is critical to understanding how underground ecosystems function.

This investigation demonstrates how StealthMole's extensive indexing of dark web content, cryptocurrency artifacts, communication channels, and historical infrastructure can help investigators move beyond surface-level observations and uncover relationships that might otherwise remain hidden.

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